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Assembly Judiciary Committee
Hearing on
SANCTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES
September 18, 1987

CHAIRMAN ELIHU HARRIS: This hearing is on the issue of
sanctions against attorneys and parties. There's been a great
deal of concern in the legal community, and I think in the public
at large, about the whole system of justice, the administration
of justice, and what makes it work; how we speed up the process;
how we discipline lawyers and others for misconduct or for
conduct that is not in the interest of justice. Sanctions are
certainly one of those weapons that has been created to get a
handle on misconduct.
Several pieces of legislation have been introduced on
the subject in the 1987-88 LegiElative Session, and those
proposals are still pending. What we would like to do at this
hearing is solicit comments on those pieces of legislation, and
more importantly, the issue of sanctions against attorneys and
parties. We want to make sure that any sanctions that are
exercised are appropriate and that they are effective.
So, in that regard, we would like to have comments and
would like to ask our first witness, Mr. Howard Dickstein, who is
with Kanter, Merin, Dickstein and Kirk of Sacramento and also
General Counsel for the Little Hoover Commission, if you would
come forward and give us some perspective on sanctions.
Mr. Leslie, do you have any opening comments that you
would like to make? Okay.
MR. HOWARD DICKSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning to you and to Mr. Leslie.
J'm General Counsel for the
Little Hoover Commission, and the Little Hoover Commission, of
course, is the sponsor of AB 1252 introduced by Assemblyman
Zeltner which is included in your packet. This bill was recently
amended on September 11 to more accurately reflect the intent of
the Commission, when it made a recommendation for attorney
sanctions in its report on the insurance liability crisis in May
of 1986. And, initially, you should be aware that the Commission
did a study of the insurance liability crisis and the impact of
the court system on that crisis. The only facts really before
the Commission, and the only justification for any changes in the
law, were based on preliminary research done in the course of
that study.
It is for that reason that the bill is limited to
the tort actions: personal injury and wrongful death actions.
It is not because the Commission feels that any other actions
shouldn't be sanctioned, but it is simply a result of the fact
that we didn't have any real knowledge one way or the other -unlike this Committee -- on other kinds of actions. We felt that
it would be inappropriate to make any recommendations outside the
circle of study.

Within the court system, certainly, there is evidence of
abuse of the system. The fact alone, that 52 cents on every
dollar paid out goes to attorneys, speaks for itself. It is
interesting to note, in that regard, that it's not just the
plaintiffs' attorneys or is it
defendants' attorneys. Most
of the issues the Commission looked at were contentious in that
those interests that support the plaintiff were on one side, and
those interests that support defendants on another. In this area
-- and I think this is what sets it apart -- it impacts both
sides. Because, certainly, in the testimony and research that
the Commission conducted, it is clear that there are both
frivolous claims filed and equally clear that frivolous motions
and defenses were and are put forward by defense attorneys.
Finally, the injured and their attorneys can make any
kind of claim, and they can do so without any economic penalties
because of the contingency fee system. And similarly, the
defense attorneys have an interest in prolonging, perhaps
delaying and making motions because of the kind of system they
work within, which, as you know, is an hourly rate system -- the
more hours an attorney puts in, the higher the attorneys fees.
To the best of our knowledge, that 52 cents on the dollar we
split very evenly.
This is an area of concern to the Commission where
(inaudible) and it is a difficult area to draw a line in. On the
one hand, obviously, it's a matter of policy that use of the
judicial system encourages a peaceful, orderly settlement of
these suits. We discourage self-help. It is an adjunct, the
mainstay of our system. There are constitutional underpinnings
of the rights plaintiffs have to seek redress. There's
constitutional underpinnings in the litigation as a form of
speech. The professional responsibility of attorneys and to
their clients is to pursue
avenue, in fact every possible
meritorious cause. It's not c
to plaintiffs' attorneys in
the first instance what may turn out to be meritorious and what
may not turn out to be meritorious. It's the discove~J system,
an elaborate and developed system, that
the attorneys make
that determination, so in some ways
ff's attorney gets
caught in the middle between
obligations to the
client and the ethical obl
as an officer of the court to
ensure that the courts time is not wasted.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, but let me interrupt one second.
Is your opposition basically to the law as it's been amended
regarding sanctions for these types of actions, or is it against
its application?
MR. DICKSTEIN: Well, I think the opposition to the law
as it stands is that it has not operated as a deterrent. I think
that AB 1252, as amended, would free up the sanctions from the
monetary costs to the parties, which is unlike other bills that
I'm aware of at least. The bill, as amended, very clearly would
provide a penalty as well as the costs and attorney fees against
the offending party, so that you have something like a civil
- 2 -

penalty and it would be something that the judge would have to
exercise with discretion.
I know, in discussions with the
Judges' Association -- which opposed, and I think you can look in
your packets for their letter of opposition on AB 1252 -- their
reasoning was that we repealed existing CCP 128.5. Well, in its
present form, it doesn't do that and it's never been the
intention that it should do that.
It would leave 128.5 just as
it is but add, at least in the case of tort actions, a greater
penalty and more discretion. We learned in our discussions with
judges, at least at the trial court level, that it's rare,
particularly in Sacramento County, for there ever to be a
sanction of more than $1,000 or $1,500.
So it was with that in
mind that the bill comes in to give judges more discretion.
It's my understanding, after talking to representatives
of the Judges' Association about their opposition to the bill in
its current form, that they would not oppose the bill in its
current form.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ms. DeBow, if you don't mind, could
you give us a summary of the legislation in this area as well as
the current status of either support or opposition?
MS. DEBORAH DeBOW: Yes, to the extent that I know what
the support or opposit1on is. There are currently three bills
pending before our committee. Probably one or any of them will
be heard in January. One of them is AB /45, by Mr. Harris. All
it does is delete the "solely intended to cause delay" in 128.5.
Then there is Assembly Bill 1252, Mr. Zeltner's bill which Mr.
Dickstein is speaking to, which adds a special penalty in
personal injury or wrongful death actions when a frivolous motion
or a frivolous claim or defense is asserted, or a party causes
unnecessary delay, and that penalty is up to $10,000. There is a
third bill, AB 1914, which would enact Federal Rule 11 into
California law, which requires that an attornP.y do reasonable
inquiry and provide a certification when the attorney files a
pleading with the court that it is well grounded in fact and
lost.
Now Senate Bill 379, by Mr. Presley, was passed last
week, and it adopts Rule 11 for two counties in a pilot project
in Riverside and San Bernardino, which is substantially similar
to Assembly Bill 1914, Mr. Harris' bill adopting Rule 11.
In 1985, there was Senate Bill 379, by Mr. Ellis, which
recast 128.5 provisions. There has been some concern that,
perhaps, in the recasting and nel., definitions that we opened up
some problems in using 128.5 that, perhaps, we should look at and
remedy. It is also pointed out there were major concerns that we
didn't have time to address in 1985 and that we should be looking
at over the next few years. So, that's another reason for having
this hearing. The reason why we introduced Assembly Bill 245 is
to open up the discussion and see if, perhaps, something else
ought to be done.

-
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The other bills that also address sanctions -- well not
like 128.5 does -- is the Discovery Act for abuses in discovery,
which went into effect July 1st, 1987, and then there's some
belief that the pilot projects -- what is it? Assembly Bill
3300?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, the Trial Court Delay Reduction

Act.
MS. DeBOW: Yes, that some other needs for sanctions
under 128.5 may be reduced because of AB 3300.
CHAIRMAN HA.RRIS: Thank you very much. All right, I
want to recognize my colleagues, Tim Leslie, who's been here, and
Mr. Friedman, who just joined us. Mr. Friedman, we have just
begun by having testimony by Mr. Dickstein, who is General
Counsel for the Little Hoover Commission, on the subject of Mr.
Zeltner's bill relative to sanctions. And, Mr. Dickstein, I hope
I didn't interrupt your train of thought with that interruption.
But if you could continue, I think we have a background for the
bills that are under consideration.
MR. DICKSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really have
few opening remarks to make.
I think this bill is pretty
self-explanatory and I don't want to go on too much.
I note that
there are witnesses that are going to testify, that appear to
have a depth and backgr6und in this area, and I'm anxious to hear
from them.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The Little Hoover Commission,
basically, isolated and focused its concerns on that narrow issue
MR. DICKSTEIN: This was one of eight or nine
legislative recommendations, all of
ch are making their way,
successfully or unsuccessfully, through the Legislature.
I would note only a
more things: One, as Ms.
DeBow indicated, the new Discovery Act
have a pretty
detailed sanction provision that we haven't really had an
opportunity to see the impact of. There is CCP 2023, and a lot
of care was taken in its drafting and I think it will be
interesting for the Committee and
Commission to note what its
impact in operation is. It is limited to discovery abuses, and
it defines discovery abuses in a fairly narrow way, so it
certainly wouldn't apply to complaints or claims or summary
judgment motions or certain kinds of defenses, but I think the
fact that it does provide for a number of alternative types of
sanction that don't exist at the present time may well be of
interest, because it's not just monetary sanctions that are going
to do the trick, but actual impact on the outcome of the
litigation, the termination of it, or the admission of certain
issues, or the evidentiary implications of frivolous motions.
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Another point is that in Assembly Bill 1252, as it now
stands, and as 128.5 also provides, there's a hearing. That, ~
think, is an important provision, -- certainly for the Commission
in its study -- in striking an adequate balance between the
rights of both attorneys to bring motions and claims, and also
the rights of society in general and of the defendants not to be
harassed.
It's important, the Commission thought, to provide for
a hearing so that these civil penalties, particularly when they
can go up to ~10,000 in addition to the actual costs in
attorney's fees, shouldn't be made or done lightly but that all
the facts come out prior to the imposition of any such penalty.
And there is a California Supreme Court case that appears to me
to indicate that such a hearing is a necessary element prior to
the imposition of a sanction. That case was for appellate
sanctions. It didn't apply to trial court sanctions, but the
reasoning, I would think, is equally applicable.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee, AB 1252 in its present form attacks a specific
problem, a problem the Commission had information about. It
contains, we feel, adequate safeguards to protect the profession,
and to the extent that it separates the penalty amount from the
actual cost to the parties, its purpose is to provide a greater
deterrent than any of the existing bills now in force to
accomplish that objective. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Any questions?
couple of questions. Ms. DeBow would like to ...

We have a

MS. DeBOW: In your personal role as an attorney, do you
feel that there is any public policy reason to limit this $10,000
sanction to personal injury or wrongful death actions?
MR. DICKSTEIN: No. No, and it's my understanding that
the Commission has no opposition to changes in the law outside of
it; it's just that it had no knowledge on its own to support such
legislation.
It's as simple as that.
MS. DeBOW:

But in your personal experience .•.

MR. DICKSTEIN:
In my personal experience, I think that
it is broader.
I don't think there's any question in my mind. I
have both experience as a defense attorney in litigation and I do
plaintiffs' work -- about half and half. There's no question in
my mind that the sanctions should apply to cases other than tort
actions.
In my experience, again -- in response to your question
-- a lot of the so-called frivolous claims really come out of
what I would consider ego battles among the attorneys (getting
one up on each other or getting angry at each other or having
personality conflicts that are being worked out through the
courts) that have little or nothing -- and r think nothing is the
more appropriate description -- to do with the merits of the case
or the ultimate outcome of the case, as much as they do to the
relationship between counsel.

-
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Now, I find that when you have a good relationship with
counsel and there's mature counsel, the problems are worked out
in a more civilized way without involving the entire judicial
system. But it's very difficult, I think, under present law, and
the judges appear to me to be very -- it has to be a very extreme
abuse the way the law is now written, before a judge will step
in, and it's usually only after the second, third, or fourth time
that that abuse occurs.
In federal court, I find, again in my personal
experience, that attorneys are a little bit less willing to go
out and fight those kinds of battles before a federal judge,
because a federal judge will be more likely, at least in the
Eastern District in Sacramento, to sanction the attorney. The
kinds of battles that occur in the superior and municipal courts
are more likely to occur before the magistrates in federal court,
which is another way of going that none of the bills address: to
actually take discovery and put it at some other level so that it
doesn't impact the court system as such. You have another kind
of system that may be something that will be worthwhile looking
into, the magistrates system and its application to the state
courts.
MS. DeBOW: Did you intend for this bill to apply to
complaints and cross-complaints, also?
MR. DICKSTEIN:

Yes.

MS. DeBOW: Okay. Now, the standards that you've set up
in terms of defining frivolous motion, claim, or defense are
slightly different than those already provided in 128.5. Do you
have a reason for this?
MR. DICKSTEIN: Well, I think the difference is really a
similar difference to Mr. Harris' bill about "solely for the
purpose of delay." I think that's the only significant
difference that I can determine. It's almost impossible, I
think, in my experience-- and the Commission's investigation
bore this out -- to say that the sole cause of something is a
delay. There's always some justification on some other level.
But if the primary thrust of it is that it causes unnecessary
delay, that, I think, implies that there was no other
justification, no other real justification in terms of furthering
the claim or furthering a defense to the claim or getting at
information; so by eliminating that word, at least in the tort
context, I think it makes a more realistic deterrent.
MS. DeBOW: Okay. One of the standards under AB 1252 is
that "it must have been made in bad faith, either for prolonging
or delaying litigation, and to harass another party." The first
test is a two-pronged test, and the second test is "without any
reasonable basis in law or fact and lacking any good faith
argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." Was one concern to limit the chilling effect on a party or
do you have another purpose?
- 6 -

MR. DICKSTEIN: No, no. There was really no other
purpose in that.
I understand the distinction you're making and
I think that those things should be carefully looked at and
drafted for consistency. At the same time, as a practical
matter, you rarely if ever see a case where the purpose was delay
that didn't have the impact of harassing the other party.
They're really two sides of the same coin, and I can't really
think offhand of an example of one without the other. One way of
harassing a party is delaying the course of the litigation.
ASSEMBLYMAN TIM LESLIE: As the non-attorney member of
this panel, at least today, you can enlighten me on some things
that everybody else in the room will already know about:. You
indicated that sometimes personalities between counsels can give
rise to some of the delaying tactics that would be involved in
the legislation. Could you give me one hypothetical situation or
scenario as to how this might arise and what kind of delaying
tactic might be used?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

The one that you used.

MR. DICKSTEIN: That was the first thing that came to
mind, (laughter) but I was going to put it as, "A colleague of
mine once did .•. "
I guess what we'll sometimes see is where the attorneys
really differ sharply on the merit of the case, and the defense
attorney feels that the plaintiff is really a gold-digger and
really has no business bringing the action, and the defense
attorney has a good relationship with his or her client. The
defense attorney will do things, probably, that would not
otherwise be done.
For example, I know of a situation in which the defense
attorney came to know that the plaintiff was on an extended trip
to Europe, and after a year and a half or so of litigation, the
defense attorney decided that it was time to initiate a discovery
device that would result in a psychiatric examination of the
plaintiff which would require the plaintiff to come back within a
certain period of time. Then the plaintiff's attorney would make
motions for protective orders and the defense attorney would
argue that it was absolutely necessary that the plaintiff be
produced at a certain time for this psychiatric examination, and
the relevance of the psychiatric examination was kind of
tangential in the case.
The case I'm thinking of was a sex harassment case. The
director of an organization was accused of harassing a plaintiff.
And the defense attorney wanted to see if the plaintiff was
normal, what her background was like, whether she was unusually
sensitive, and arguably that was relevant. At the same time,
there were motions up and back and up and back as to when it was
going to be scheduled and whether the person was going to have to
come back from this trip, and whether the -- what we call the
at-issue memo in which the lawyers agree that the case was ready
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to be tried -- should be pulled because the plaintiff wasn't
being made available for discovery. Then there was a motion to
make it no longer at issue. And it just can go on and develop
into tremendous struggles.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Given this scenario, then-- that's
a good example. Thank you -- if AB 1252 were in fact law, how
would it deal with this? It would take the judge to determine
that there was frivolous activity going on and then he could
impose a $10,000 fine?
MR. DICKSTEIN:
In addition to the costs. This is
probably not an insurable item; this is not insured under a
malpractice policy, for a number of reasons which I think other
witnesses will address. But I think it would provide a real
deterrent if it meant that the attorneys had to dig into their
own pockets. Sometimes the costs are not that great. They're
usually $1000 or less, so they're not that much of a deterrent,
but if an attorney's going to have to dig into his own pocket for
$8,000 or $9,000 plus the attorney's fees, I think he'd swallow
before doing something like that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. Mr. Leslie's
question is on point, although I think your answer is more
responsive to the sanctions that are just limited to the
Discovery Act reform. What about a trial? Why can't the judge,
when he has got the party in court on the existing sanctions,
exercise the appropriate disciplinary function to maintain
control of the case and the process by which the case is being
resolved?
MR. DICKSTEIN:
the trial of the case?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You say, "in court".

Do you mean during

Yes, during the trial.

MR. DICKSTEIN: I think the judge could but, first of
all, very few of the cases ever get to trial, so you've already
ruled out 98% of the cases. If you talk about sanctions during a
trial, it's just going to apply to a few cases. Once you get
into trial •••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't see the problem of
sanctions, basically, as being problems that visit the case at
trial?
MR. DICKSTEIN:

No.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But during discovery and during
motions preceding the actual trial, settlement conferences and
other kinds of things ...
MR. DICKSTEIN: Once you are
trial, particularly if
there is a jury there, then the attorneys are going to be
conscious about not wanting to come off as harassing and
- 8 -

delaying.
do.

The jurors have things to do, everyone has things to

My experience, and the testimony of the Commission, was
it was mostly in the bringing of the claim, the motions for
summary judgment, the demurrers. Another good example is
attorneys who were sued for malpractice almost always feel that
the case is without merit against them.
I've seen attorneys who won't report it to their carrier
but want to defend themselves and will demurrer -- which is to
make a motion to dismiss the case because it doesn't state a
claim -- might lose it and then keep bringing other motions
again, and again, and again, sometimes just because a certain
portion of one cause of action wasn't clearly incorporated into
another cause of action. Very technical reasons.
Now that has nothing to do with discovery, and it
wouldn't be covered by the new Discovery Act. But it would be
covered by 1252 and by all the bills, really, that the Committee
is considering.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
very much.
MR. DICKSTEIN:

Okay.

Any other questions?

Thank you

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I would like to next call Mr. Richard
Fruin of Lawler, Felix & Hall, Los Angeles, who is the author of
articles related to sanctions. Thank you.
I appreciate your
joining us.
MR. RICHARD FRUIN: My name is Richard Fruin, F-R-U-I-N.
By way of background, I graduated from law school at the
University of California, Berkeley, in 1965. I've been with my
present firm since that date.
I do commercial litigation.
I
don't do any personal injury or wrongful death litigation. I
represent both plaintiffs and defendants, both big and small
plaintiffs and defendants.
I have written several articles in obscure journals and
Ms. DeBow found one of them, and I have been active in several
bar association committees on sanctions.
I would like to address just two problems, but perhaps
before I do that, I could remark upon Mr. Dickstein's comments.
I would agree with him that there is no problem with attorney
abuse at trial. Once you are in front of the judge, the judge
can control it and can understand what is going on.
One of the reasons there is less
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

In your experience they do?
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MR. FRUIN: Yes, they do. Sometimes you get weak judges
that do not, but that's not common.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

MR. FRUIN: One of the reasons there is less litigation
abuse in federal courts is because matters are assigned to a
federal judge, a single judge at the filing window, and therefore
the judge can supervise the calendar throughout the course of the
litigation. That is not the practice in state court and, for
that reason alone, you have more litigation abuse in state court.
I disagree, I think, with Mr. Dickstein's view that
providing the ability to obtain sanctions is going to lessen the
friction that sometime occurs in lawsuits. The ability to seek
sanctions is merely another weapon. It is a way to exacerbate
rather than to minimize friction between counsel, because counsel
can dig at each other by filing motions for sanctions.
I have a whole list of situations in which fractious
counsel cause problems for each other. To respond to your
question, for instance: motions to disqualify opposing counsel~
arguments over the right to discovery or discovery of certain
items; refusal to stipulate to matters that can be obtained as a
matter of right if you make a motion to the court; making up
motions without probable success either because you don't have a
law or you don't have the facts; failure to comply with the
litigation rules either because you don't understand the rules or
because the rules are ambiguous, or because you didn't know about
the rules.
Litigation, these days, is very complex. You are
litigating in many different courts: municipal and superior in
different counties, federal appellate, arbitrations,
administrative tribunals.
Each of these courts has their own
rules, and the rules are constantly changing. The most important
rules are generally the unwritten rules, which is the custom and
pract
of that particular judge of that particular court.
Let me turn to what I was

to talk about •••

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Before you do that -- the examples you
raised. Talking about sanctions, those seem to be very difficult
sometimes to pin down in terms of the intent of the moving party.
It may be an error, but should we have sanctions where there is
no mal-intent simply because of the fact that there was delay as
a result of that action, -- by trying to disqualify the opposing
counsel for example? Is that a legitimate tool in certain
circumstances? Tell me a little bit about the sanctions as they
might apply to those motions, whether they're made for frivolous
purposes or otherwise.
MR. FRUIN: Well let me say, at the outset, that I think
intent to cause or actually causing delay is the wrong standard.
In Los Angeles County, it takes five years to get to trial in the
- 10 -

superior court. Nothing that you do in the course of litigation
is going to delay your day in court.
The proper standard is unnecessary expense. Sometimes
litigation becomes a war of attrition.
I think that unnecessary
delay is an irrelevant standard and that really you should be
focusing upon unnecessary expense. It seems to me, if that were
the standard it would clarify some of these problems. For
instance, refusal to stipulate to matters that can be obtained as
a matter of right.
You can make the motion. Having to make the motion is
not going to delay the proceeding at all. But the fact that the
other side wouldn't stipulate has caused you unnecessary expense.
Now, it wasn't frivolous, either, because the other side did not
have to stipulate. There is no obligation that a party stipulate
to things which you can get as a matter of right, but they should
have done that. They should not have cluttered the court's
calendar with a motion that should be granted.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: On that question, I assume that for
every one of the various types of motions that can be made there
has to be a reason that they are there and there must be times
when they are appropriate.
MR. FRUIN:

Yes, that's right.

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: How do you know, or how can you
demonstrate or prove when it was appropriate and when it wasn't?
MR. FRUIN: Well, I think an experienced litigation
counsel would know when the motion, although ostensibly a
discretionary motion, was a motion which the judge had no actual
discretion to deny.
There are many statutes which give courts' discretion.
They have been on the books for many years. Many of the rulings
of judges have been taken on appeal on those particular statutes
and the appellate courts have defined the standard by which the
court can deny or the standard by which a court, or under which a
court, must grant such a motion. So that if you look in the
annotations to the statute, you can determine in the clear cases
what the result is going to be. Of course there are borderline
cases too. That is why the statute is there. And if you have a
good relationship with the other counsel normally you can work
this matter out. But litigation, by definition, is adversarial;
it's fractious. You know when you are playing football, when you
are playing basketball, did anyone ever give you an elbow? Do
they ever bump you? Do they ever trip you? All of those things
are violations of rules, but it is done all the time. I think
that litigation, since it has these rules which you must follow,
provides innumerable opportunities for essentially bumping your
opponent. That is why you try to develop a good relationship
with the other attorney so that you keep your cost down.
Sometimes the other attorney is not motivated to keep your cost
down.
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litigation in the past
st shooting above 7%.
money by refusing to pay
sue and then get to
st were 15% and the
when you were found
%,
've more than covered
during the interim period
of time.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, Mr

Mr. Fruin, what motivates
your
to protect innocent other
parties from harassment and incurring unnecessary additional
expenses or is it to try to protect the court from being weighted
down in taking its time on matters
are frivolous,
compounding its problems with delay?

MR. FRUIN:
the source of my concern is that I
hate waste.
I
reso
disputes through litigation
is extremely
You must
an extraordinarily wealthy
country to do it the way we do
I hate to see money wasted.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
might like to read
MR.
philosophy.
origin. You
don't like to
should

Do

an article on that?

I

on my
But that's the
family and I
matters that
the rules are.
is more
the system?
But it's also
s' time for
thought, in
giving further
in our state
think it's feasible
the federal

countervail
cons
des
to
panels
parti
You wou
judges.
have j
inj
j
You would
time we have a de
di
and civil law j

desirable. There are
think it would be
are specialists in
who are personal injury
commercial non-personal
judges. At the present
criminal law judges
could develop

judges who are specialists and experienced in particular areas of
the law, that they could quickly evaluate a case and they could
also better control a case.
I think it might work in some
counties that have a smaller case load and fewer lawyers and
fewer claims. But I'm not sure it would work in Los Angeles.
I'm not sure that I answered the question that you
asked, Mr. Harris. Maybe I should go into what I was going to
say. I haven't really done any recent research or considered my
comments or prepared any papers at great length.
I did want to
talk about sanctions as a substitute for malicious prosecution.
And then I want to talk about sanctions as an interference with
the attorney-client relationship.
First, let me say that 128.5, as it was originally
drafted, I do not believe intended to authorize sanctions because
a claim was made in bad faith.
If you look in the legislative
history, particularly the statement made by the legislative
assistant to the Governor, it says that the statute that became
128.5 was not intended to be a substitute for malicious
prosecution.
Malicious prosecution is a tort by which the winner in a
civil law suit can file an action against the person who brought
the action or maintained the defense and established that the
claim was brought in bad faith with malice. It requires another
lawsuit. However, there are some attributes of that second
lawsuit which are not present when sanctions are used to censure
and penalize for the filing of an action. To begin with, the
defendant has a right to a jury trial, but you don't have the
right to a jury trial when you have a sanctions hearing after the
trial. The defendant has a right to discovery to see what the
costs actually incurred by the plaintiff were, but you don't have
that right when you have a sanctions hearing on a motion.
action,
counsel
defense
subject

The defendant, if a client in a malicious prosecution
has a defense that he or she has relied upon advice of
after making full disclosure of the facts, and that is a
against malicious prosecution, but that's the very
which can give rise to sanctions in a sanctions hearing.

If you've finished a trial and you've lost, and the
other side hits you with a sanctions motion, you are in a very
difficult position both professionally and morally. You may have
lost the trial, but your client might want to take an appeal.
Yet the attorney and your opponent, your adversary, is now
seeking to impose sanctions upon both you as counsel for the
client and the client. Now there are various things that can be
said, obviously, in your and your client's defense. However, you
are the attorney for the client. You are the shaper and the
presenter of the client's story. Now if the assertion is that
the claim should not have been filed, what should the lawyer do.
Should the lawyer say, "I didn't think it should be filed either
but my client wanted me to file it," or "I didn't think it was a
valid defense but I told my client they had a 10% chance of
- 13 -

prevail
on
s
fense," or "I told him, 'I don't think you
have a defense at all hut you have a right to make the plaintiff
prove
.'"Can the lawyer say that about the client in order to
remove
ibility that the lawyer himself is going to be
ject to sanct
?
He
can't do that. He has to tell his client,
"You go
yourself another lawyer who will represent you at
this sanctions hearing because I am now an adversary to you."
And the client may say, "I want you to take an appeal. You know
the case. You know the rights and wrongs of it. How can I hire
a lawyer to represent me against you at the same time I want to
hire you to take an appeal?" I think it's an insoluble problem,
and I don't think any of the bills that you have address it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
you don't want to try it.
MR. FRUIN:

Bu~

Well if it is insoluble then probably

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. FRUIN:
saying.

is permitted.

i~

Now I see what you're saying.

You created a problem.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. Now, I see what you're
I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I've got it.
MR. FRUIN:

128.5, as it was amended, has created that

problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
MR

FRUIN:

Does

~his

happen now?

Yes, it does.
s

E

MR. FRUIN
So

s

with or without any

new bill
MR. FRUIN:
1, the r
to seek sanctions, that is
the statutory
, has created
lem. If you didn't have
that statute
remedy of
prevailing party at trial
would
malicious prosecution. Indeed,
you s
problem,
's greatly minimized because they
have to
sion that they are going to instigate
another litigation. They probably wouldn't do it while the first
litigat
is on appeal if it is still on appeal. But, after
you've prevailed at the trial, it is very easy for the prevailing
counsel to move in with a sanctions motion and say, "Judge, you
have already decided this case. You know that they don't have
any real merit in this claim. You've decided so yourself." And
that's another problem that this statute creates; and that is ...
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ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Excuse me, before we get to that
I just have a point on your last comment, Mr. Fruin. Couldn't
the same dilemma be provoked by an action for malicious
prosecution following trial?
MR. FRUIN: Yes, it could be, but it's not going to
occur immediately. The day after trial •..
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Well, the action could be filed
immediately and the dilemma for the party's discovery could begin
very soon thereafter, and motion for summary judgment could be
made quite soon. That could be heard in virtually the same time
period as the sanctions hearing.
MR. FRUIN: No, I don't believe that is true. To begin
with, you can't hear a motion within 45 days from the filing and
service of the complaint and ...
sure.
same.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN:
Is it 60 or is it 90? I'm not
It's not that much different, even if it isn't exactly the

MR. FRUIN: Well, what I am saying is there are a number
of procedural protections that would prevent the immediate
hearing on a malicious prosecution action of the summary
judgment. But, you know, deciding to go forward with the
malicious prosecution action is a decision in itself. Client and
lawyer have to get together on it~ it's going to cost more money.
Once the action is filed you have procedural protections and then
the moving, that is the resisting, party could always seek a
delay which will probably be granted if the matter is still up on
appeal.
As a matter of fact, I'm not sure that you can file a
malicious prosecution action. You have to have a favorable
determination, and I don't know whether the trial court decision
is a favorable determination if you still have the right to
appeal. But, I don't want to unduly take your time.
I've
prepared an outline for a talk which I gave -- actually it was a
number of particular episodes that could occur -- and there's a
recorded California case called Lesser vs. Huntington Harbor
Corporation, in which a sanctions hearing proceeded immediately
after trial and the judge said at trial, "I don't think this case
had any merit. Come back tomorrow and I'll determine how much
I'm going to impose sanctions on the losing party." I mean, you
are hit with a thunderbolt at a point in time when the relations
between you and your client are very critical.
While I'm still on the subject of malicious prosecution,
there are some problems with all these bills. Section (d) of
128.5 says "The liability imposed by this section is in addition
to any other liability imposed by law, or act or omissions within
the purview of this section."
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The question
ses, if the prevailing party does obtain
sanctions against the losing party, is that it? Or does the
prevailing party have a right, in addition, to sue for malicious
And if the prevailing party in addition to getting
sanctions sues for malicious prosecution, is the determination of
the judge at the sanctions hearing collateral estoppel so that
the losing party has no defense in a malicious prosecution
proceeding?
In a malicious prosecution proceeding the plaintiff
says, "One judge has already decided that this claim had no
merit, was frivolous, was done for the purpose of delay, and now
I want you simply to rubber stamp that decision."
You have another question. What if you're hit with a
sanction and it is $10,000, and you pay $10,000, and then the
prevailing party sues you for malicious prosecution? Do you get
an offset for the $10,000 that you paid?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
In that regard, do you think there
should be a choice of one or the other or do you feel that both
are appropriate?
MF. FRUIN: Yes, yes, there should be a choice. As a
matter of fact there is a statute -- I don't have it in mind
right now, but it was adopted before 128.5 -- that says, when you
sue a governmental entity and you lose, and it's determined that
the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous or something
like that, you can seek sanctions but that is determinative of
your right to sue for malicious prosecution.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You elect one or the other?

MR. FRUIN: You elect one or the other. But I think
that
b
st problem is the
that the sanctions motion
1 drives between the attorney and his client.
However,
after
that
occurs not only if a sanctions motion is brought to
ly anytime a sanctions motion is brought. It's
tr
ing away at the attorney-cl
relationship because
always
the lawyer is always tempted to explain away his responsibility
by saying, "It was my client's decision to bring this matter."

In Great Britain, the barristers follow what is known as
the "cab rule" -- I think it's called the "cab rule" -- which
means to say that any barrister is for hire; that the worst
person, the scummiest person in Great Britain, can go to the best
barrister and if he can pay his fees, he can hire that barrister.
The barrister is there as a public utility.
Well, you know, we have vestiges
and it pops up in odd ways throughout our
at least that's an ideal, that anyone can
if they can persuade the lawyer that they
get that lawyer to represent them.
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of the British system
litigation system. But
go to a good lawyer and
have a case, they can

But this right of sanctions, you see, is making the
lawyer personally responsible for the sort of investigation that
the lawyer has done in trying to find out whether the client has
a good case or not. You have professional questions like,
"should you advise your client in writing that should this motion
be brought, that there is a possibility of sanctions?" If you
have to advise your client in writing, it's a substantial
additional expense.
Sanctions can be used to make the other side jittery.
As an example, for instance, I have an associate who is appearing
on a demurrer today in the Santa Monica Court. He filed this
demurrer in July, but in the Santa Monica Court you have to get a
reservation in order to have a hearing. So the hearing was
today, although this was filed some two months ago.
The opposition need not be filed until five days before
the hearing. So the opposition was filed and mailed on Monday,
or we received it on Monday, I forget which. But the opposition
asked for sanctions for a hearing set this Friday. And why did
they ask for sanctions? Well there were a variety of reasons.
One reason was that the demurrer wasn't set for hearing within 30
days, which is required by the statute.
The Santa Monica court won't hear any demurrer within 30
days. And there were a number of other little things like that.
They said that the demurrer was not set out in a separate piece
of paper. Well, we got the opposition on Monday, and it sought
sanctions for a hearing on Friday. You have to file any reply
two days before the hearing, so the reply had to be filed on
Wednesday.
Then it asked for sanctions.
inappropriate, but what do you do?

Well sanctions were

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Are you familiar, Mr. Fruin, with
sanctions on sanctions motion? It would seem that your
description and my experience bears out that often times
sanctions are used as part of one party's strategy to do all the
things that sanctions motions are intended to minimize. How
frequently does it occur that a party and counsel in the position
of your associate today would respond by seeking sanctions for
the opposing party's attempt to get sanctions against you so
late?
MR. FRUIN: Well, in this particular episode it is not
possible. You have due process requirements for the hearing of a
sanctions motion. The present law and the present bill say that
a sanctions motion may be contained in a party's responding
papers. So, this sanctions motion was properly included in the
responding motions, despite the fact that the responding motions
were received five days before the hearing.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN:
I guess what I'm saying is,
there's two bases for seeking sanctions on sanctions: you could
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s you too little time to
ous, it's meant to harass, or
to as a basis for sanction
could be said
,
I wouldn't bring it
FRUIN:
than you're going to get.
cost of
you start entangling a
You're going to lose it
matter,
you run the risk
sanct
motion into
overlooked
because
the parties
of the merits of the matter
That's
the
part of the
are concerned about the sanctions
financial interest:
motion
which the 1
a
rise to the claim
it's not the merits of the matter
for sanctions.

MR

Then, the
that you have to wonder how
can decide the merits of
whether or not the mot
is
outline I . . .

ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS:
make that j
to witness
?
MR. FRUIN

, another problem is
judge can be such that he
independently decide
brought, and in this
be the best person to
would have the chance
however judges have
a heavy calendar.
s are very
should not be
going to impose
is the best person to
may have their
summary I have

to comply
or the mer
judge perhaps could
sanctions for
lat
, 1
It's
to
However
deficiency

way of solution.
I think that
"process" sanctions, and
sanctions. The
a process failure. You
the person who filed
s, or some other
responsibility of the
nothing to do with the
's position. I think that a
to routinely impose
be like a traffic
to get your attention.
for a substantive
s rise to other

considerations, such as the attorney-client relationship, more
substantive due process, that sort of thing. So I think you
might make a distinction between those two areas in your
thinking.
Secondly, I would suggest that maybe a sanctions motion
should be separately noticed, rather than being tacked on to the
main motion or being tacked on to the opposition. That would
lessen the likelihood that it's going to be routinely thrown on
and is going to make a cleaner record with respect to the
responsibility of the parties in making a sanctions motion.
Also, it would limit the possibility that the merits of the
motion are going to become entangled with the personalities and
the conduct of the clients and the attorneys before the judge.
I have nothing further to say. It's a very interesting
topic, and in many aspects of it the literature is inadequate in
describing the actual problems with the sanctions movement. I
would say that, you know, in Great Britain and British
Commonwealth countries, the loser pays the costs of the winner.
And, in many ways, sanctions are kind of an evolutionary
development in American law moving in that direction. Because,
in actual practice, this standard of frivolousness or bad faith
gets watered down a great deal, particularly if it's a motion
which is filed just after the conclusion of a trial. You don't
have time to tell the court whether or not you have good faith or
bad faith, or what the frivolousness of the claim or the defense
was. So that gets blurred. The judge says, "You lost. You were
wrong. You pay sanctions." And sanctions become a way of
fee-shifting. It's consistent with the fact that more and more
statutes which are passed now at both the state and federal level
have fee shifting provisions in them. And I don't think that the
standards that you have put in the proposed statutes or in the
present statute, really in practice are much of a barrier to the
imposition of sanctions when a judge really wants to impose them.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Fruin. You were very
helpful and insightful. This is an important topic. We have a
lot of pressure on us, as you are aware, both in the area of
disciplining lawyers for misconduct and for not being
professional in their demeanor. There is also a lot of pressure
on us because of the five-year average trial time it takes to
resolve a matter in Los Angeles. Sanctions are one of the tools
available and we want to make sure it is used appropriately. The
complexities, I think, of sanctions and malicious prosecution,
and the side issues that emerge therefrom, are very important and
you pointed them out to us. In trying to draft some legislation,
I think, we'll be a little more creative as well as a little more
conscious of the complexities in this area.
ASSEMBLYMAN I"ESLIE: At this point, I have a
The conflict that can be created between the attorney
client, when it gets down to, not the process kind of
the substantive kinds of issues, I guess the attorney
always argue that the client had to make the decision
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question.
and the
things but
could
because I

, the buck would
client theoretically in
the situations I've
you're almost
in this -- that
's advice and

cl

I think that most
must rely totally
have a good case or a

MR. FRUIN: I
almost a
to tell

ASSEMBLYMAN JJESLIE: So it's a
22, in terms of
I mean the attorney's trying to
that one
of
He can always say, "Well, I
defend himself against sanct
explained
to my client ... "
re

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
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went ahead

You're
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client made a bad
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encouraging it.
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sk that sanctions are
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challenged
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
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the 1 igation process
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use every
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s, it's true that
s a problem. Every
sanctions may be
there were 99 times
all of the
it's your fault,
client, whether
through the file
law to see how
sanctions were not
in order to defend
is being questioned and
like very much and
ssional.
, my difficulty is that
available to counsel in
nature are
other side's
al process and you
reality, that if you
think about it next

time there's a play run, so sometimes you do that. So,
obviously, we want to make sure that we understand that sometimes
those things serve, if not appropriate purposes, certainly the
purposes of those people that are utilizing those tools. Maybe
we want to make sure that if they use them they don't get caught
when they're using them in an inappropriate way, because there's
going to be a penalty. But that's all we can do.
MR. FRUIN:

That's true.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Thank you.

Okay. I'd like to next ask Ms. Lynne Yates-Carter, who
is the Legislative Chair of the Executive Committee of the Family
Law Section of the State Bar of California to come forward. How
are you today?
MS. LYNNE YATES-CARTER: The Family Law Section has
reviewed the Assembly Bills that are before you today. I think
you have in front of you our position paper on one of the bills
that we had a great of concern about, which was AB 1252.
Attorneys' fees, costs, and .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Your letter on that bill doesn't
relate to the bill as it is now before us, I don't think.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
if you were here.

The bill's been amended.

MS. CARTER: That's right.
it was being amended on that date.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
that bill?

I don't know

It was my understanding that

Does that change your position on

MS. CARTER: As far as our concerns on the bill, and if
you let me grab that bill very quickly, the AB 1252 copy •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Yes, all the points in your letter,
which were well taken, aren't relevant. So you'll either be
needing to come up with some new points or I guess we'll need
your opposition or, of course, you can do whatever you want.
MS. CARTER: Okay. If the sanctions that are imposable
in an action generally are limited to $10,000, we would have an
ongoing objection because we have an ongoing concern where the
ever-increasing cost of family law litigation is often
exacerbated by the opposition between the parties and the desires
of the parties (the emotional questions that come into family law
situations) that increase the amount of costs overall. As
presently drafted, AB 1252 does talk about sanctions, a
legislative intent to limit the sanctions in personal injury and
death cases to a cap of $10,000.
If that is the only cap, then
we wouldn't be as concerned about the impact on family law and
the cap that might be raised on the family law action.
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What we still have an ongoing concern about is the
standard that's being used in drafting the legislation on the
imposition of attorneys' fees and costs and where there is a
delineation between the motive, and I'm looking at Section 3 in
the amended version of 1252, talking about what a frivolous
motion claim or defense is, either for the purposes of prolonging
or delaying the resolution of a litigation and to harass the
other party. I think we'd have an ongoing concern with that
language, because we see that as being an "or" proposition. In
family law, very often you have a party who may want to prolong
the case. They may want to harass the case, and the tactics they
use may have either effect. We want to leave the general ability
of the court to impose sanctions as open as possible.
I don't know if the Committee's aware of the use of
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions in family law. Generally,
at the present time, I'd like to address that very briefly. In
many counties, including the county that I practice in -- Santa
Clara County -- the family law filings in superior court
presently constitute 40% of the total filings. We have local
rules. We have special guidelines that cover the area of
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions, and even with that we've
always looked at CCP 128.5 as being a very valuable tool in an
attorney's arsenal to try to stop nonrneritorious litigation and
abuses of the process.
One issue that has come up in the past is whether or not
there ought to be any limitations on a party's ability to get
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions under 128.5 and whether or
not the recent revisions in the Discovery Act would eliminate the
value of 128.5. We still see that as being a backup and needed
piece of legislation to help us meet the often very ski~.lful
tactics employed in family law actions to delay the litigation,
to increase the cost of litigation, and to try to force one party
out of being able to fund ongoing litigation in family law, which
results in a very serious loss of personal rights. We would urge
you, in considering this question, to leave as open as possible
the availability of sanctions, attorneys' fees, and costs,
especially keeping them open in family law actions.
I'd be glad to answer any questions that the committee
might have specifically.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Talk to me very briefly, if you would,
about the $10,000 limit that you object to as an inappropriate
level.
MS. CARTER:

Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm not sure I quite understand. I
know that it's a lot of money. Is that the only reason? One of
the traditional attitudes is if the punishment measures up to the
crime or the misdeed, then why is $10,000 or could not $10,000 be
appropriate if it is discretionary with the judge? Look at the
particular case, look at the amount of delay, look at the
- 22 -

particular cost, look at how egregious it was. Might it not be
worth $10,000? What if it was a Joan Collins' divorce? There's
plenty of money involved, and this guy makes these comments that
turn out to be totally in error. He made some assertions, made
some motions, and the motions were made on these assertions, and
we found out that it was all fantasy, and caused her a lot of
embarrassment, caused a lot of problems, caused a lot of delays,
and held her up to more ridicule in those magazine pulp pieces.
Tell me about it. Might not just $10,000 be appropriate?
MS. CARTER:

We're saying $10,000 may not be enough.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Right.

MS. CARTER: Unfortunately, in many civil cases there
can't be a finite end to the litigation. One of the common
tenets of family law attorneys is if there are children and if
there is support being paid, that litigation isn't going to end
until the support terminates or until the children are age 18, or
possibly beyond depending upon what happens with pending
legislation. The problem is that the in-court battles can extend
over a period of years. During those in-court battles, because
of delays on the civil calendar, because of the lesser
availability of courtrooms for family law cases -- somehow a
family law case with $200,000 in assets is seen as less serious
than a P.I. case involving $75,000 in a demand -- because of
those problems we have extended family law litigation, with
ever-increasing costs of that family law litigation, and if you
put a $10,000 cap on it that's not enough. That's not enough to
compensate for the nonmeritorious motions that may be brought in
the intervening years.
We're saying no cap, absolutely no cap.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, I see. Now I understand.
thought you were saying that $10,000 was too much.

I

MS. CARTER: Oh, no. By no means. I have a case
pending now where my fees are close to $80,000.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:

What is the sanction fee based upon

today?
MS. CARTER: Attorneys' fees and costs. Some counties
have adopted local rules as well that impose for specific
sanctions being assessed for violation of local rules as a
policy.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: If today it's attorneys' fees and
costs, and this bill makes it attorneys' fees, costs, plus -don't you think that this bill makes progress then? You're
opposing it because it doesn't go far enough, but it's taking a
step that's never been taken before.

- 23 -

MS. CARTER: In the initial draft we did oppose it
because it didn't go far enough and because it set a specific
cap, and we opposed the specific cap because we thought it wasn't
enough.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
should be increased to?

So, what amount do you think it

MS. CARTER: Whatever amount the court deems appropriate
under the circumstances.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: In other words, you'd say court
costs, expenses, and penalties as determined by the court?
MS. CARTER: Attorneys' fees, costs, and appropriate
sanctions -- I'm not trying to draft the legislation -- various
elements would include attorneys' fees, costs, and also provide
the court with the opportunity to award sanctions. Now, again, I
can't speak for the Committee on the amended bill because we
didn't even consider the amended bill, but we will be addressing
that issue, I'm sure.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: But from what I can gather now, the
only problem that you have with the bill -- or one of the
problems you have with the bill -- is that it just doesn't go far
enough, and you'd like to see the cap off and leave it totally to
the discretion of the judge in terms of the sanction amount.
MS. CARTER: That's right, again because ••. , I'm not
saying every case in family law is a marathon, by any means. But
we do have cases where one side, at the very outset of the
litigation, is determined to "get" the other side.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Would you rather have no bill, or
would you rather have a bill that provided for $10,000? I mean,
if it came down to that.
MS. CARTER: If I had my "druthers" -- and I speak as an
individual and not for the Committee, because I can't speak for
the Committee on this -- I would like to have a bill that
expressly makes sanctions, over and above reasonable attorneys'
fees or attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses actually incurred,
available. Under this process I would like to see, individually,
the legislation drafted to incorporate the possibility of getting
it not only for tactics that are harassment, but also as a
separate issue those that cause unnecessary delay.
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Well, I think I agree with you, but
I just was wondering, if it carne down to a point of negotiation
and you had to decide if there was going to be no sanction
amounts, as is the current practice, or there was going to be a
cap put into the law, would you rather have none or would you
rather have it with a cap?

-
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MS. CARTER: I think that I'd rather have a cap, if I
had to choose between the two, but my preference by far is having
an open-ended amount for those very egregious cases.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Any questions? Thank you
very much. We appreciate it very much. Are there any other
witnesses? Anyone else who has heard the testimony who would
like to make a comment on the question of sanctions? I think
we've gotten, at least from my perspective, some varying
viewpoints on the question that are going to help us formulate
either one or a number of pieces of legislation on the question,
because we are obviously looking for tools to expedite the trial
process and the civil litigation process in general. I think the
ideas that have been elicited and the comments that have been
made are going to help us to draft appropriate parameters in this
area.
I don't have any other questions.
else, Ms. DeBow?

Is there anything

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Could we have just a moment for a
little internal discussion? I assume that what we've been
talking about this morning would come under the category,
generally, of tort reform?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, not really.
reform or trial delay reform.

Perhaps litigation

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: One of our witnesses was talking
about this as being a tort reform kind of thing.
MS. DeBOW: Specifically, what he was addressing was
what they did their study on and what the final results were.
was with the Little Hoover Commission, right?
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE:
Right.
this as it related to tort reform.
MS. DeBOW:
wrongful death.

He

They were concerned about

As it related to personal injury and

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Well, you know what I'm kind of
wondering about is that last Friday, we had quite a discussion
about ••.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

It was on the table in terms of .••

ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Yes, and you know, if someone would
consider this tort reform, would we have to postpone this hearing
for five years?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We don't have to postpone it. The
trial lawyers and the insurance industry and the manufacturers
and doctors and 90% of the people of California would not care
about it. No, I don't think it would specifically fall under
that at all.
I think it is much more about the process.
-

?.5 -

Mr. Friedman, do you have any more to add?
FRIEDMAN: A point that didn't come up that
aware of is
use and abuse of
prosecut
by parties who are
various public interest entities, especially
st board was performed by pro bono •..

ASSEMBLY~~N

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You have some experience in that.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Yes, I do.
In fact, just
yesterday, I was talking to people in my L.A. office who had
involved some pro bono counsel from a major Los Angeles law firm.
It was a terribly egregious case. It was in the paper this week.
It was an eviction of a woman.
It seems that the party in that
case, who was trying to evict her -- the landlord -- is infamous.
When he is involved in litigation with pro bono counsel on the
other side, he invariably brings sanctions actions against them
or malicious prosecution actions if they try to block whatever
he's trying to do that's typically illegal. And that
intimidates, and sometimes successfully, pro bono counsel because
in the major law firms it creates such enormous malpractice
premiums that the simple threat of being sued for malicious
prosecution or sanctions chills their participation. And the
fact that it could be filed would increase their premiums by tens
of thousands of dollars just because they're involved in a case.
A lot of these matters involve creating new law, trying to find
new ways to protect innocent victims. I don't necessarily see
that this is directly on
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

What about your sanctions point,

though?
it's a reasonable fear.
, but the professional
well as use malicious
counsel from acting or
unrepresented.
,
looked at the
whether or not they've been
addressing those kinds of

ling or
Mr. Friedman

MS. DeBOW: No
comments today and having
to a
r of
s area who have mentioned
that it's a problem.
It's a procedural problem.
It does not
remedy
malpract
insurance premium problem.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
problem because, obvious

I think we ought to address that
, sanctions can be misused. Okay.

Any other matter to come before the committee?
Thank you.
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October 2, 1987

The Honorable Elihu M. Harris
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
California Legislature
State Capitol
P. 0. Box 942849
Sacramento, California 94249-0001
Dear Chairman Harris:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
Committee on September 18, 1987 to comment on the bills currently
under consideration to amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5.
This letter will summarize my specific suggestions to the Committee
to clarify Section 128.5.
1.

Sanctions As A Substitution For Malicious Prosecution.

Under present wording, Section 128.5 may be employed to
impose sanctions on a party, his counsel or both at the trial
court conclusion if the claim, or presumably the defense, is
deemed to be in bad faith and pursued frivolously or to cause
unnecessary delay.
Section 128.5 in this usage is a substitute
for an independent action for malicious prosecution, however, the
inter-relationship between Section 128.5 and malicious prosecution
is not addressed by the statute. Left open by the statute and
case law are the issues of whether a litigant may proceed both
with a claim under Section 128.5 and a malicious prosecution
action; whether a determination on the 128.5 motion is collateral
estoppel with respect to a subsequent malicious prosecution
action; and whether any award paid as a sanction is an offset
against a subsequent successful malicious prosecution judgment.

•

At the hearing, Chairman Harris suggested that perhaps a
litigant should be allowed to pursue either a sanctions award
under Section 128.5 or malicious prosecution action but not both.
That approach, in which I would concur, is already embodied in
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1038.
(Section 1038 was adopted
in 1980, one year before the original Section 128.5.) Section
1038 applies to actions filed against the State or its political
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subdivisions and provides that if the action is concluded in the
State's favor by summary judgment or nonsuit, the State may make
application for an award of its legal fees by showing that the
action was brought without "reasonable cause" and without a "good
faith belief that there was a justiciable controversy under the
facts and law . . . " Section 1038(c) specifically provides as
follows:
" . . and any party requesting the relief pursuant to
this section waives any right to seek damages for
malicious prosecution. Failure to make such motion shall
not be deemed a waiver of the right to pursue a malicious
prosecution action."
I would urge that Section 128.5 be amended consistently with
Section 1038, to preclude a party who moves for sanctions under
Section 128.5 for his opponent's bringing of the action from
subsequently seeking recovery for the tort of malicious
prosecution on the same matter.
2.

The Entanglement Of Sanctions With The Merits Of The

Motion.
Our discussion at the hearing also covered the fact that
an application for sanctions filed in a pre-trial proceeding may
divert attention away from the merits of the motion and cause the
attorney resisting such an application to spend time to the
detriment
the presentation on the merits of the motion. This
is
cularly so because Section 128.5(b)(l) as presently
written
s that an application for sanctions may be noticed
"in a
's
or responding
The section appears
to contemplate that
ication for sanctions may be an
"add-on" to a motion or
opposition to a motion, and, in
actual practice, most sanction applications are an "add-on" to
the motion or the opposition. The coupling of a substanti.ve
motion with an application for sanctions makes the opposing party
~not only defend on the merits but also defend his motives with
the risk that merits and motives may become entangled. The
filing of sanctions application, as I expressed at the hearing,
. also raises the specter of a conflict between the attorney and
his or her client just at the time when the attorney is attempting
to present the client's position.
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I would suggest that Section 128.5 be amended to provide \
that any application for sanctions must be noticed as a separate
motion and must be accompanied and supported by a statement of
·
proposed findings justifying the requested sanctions. The
requirement of a separate motion, to my mind, will reduce the
number of frivolous sanctions applications filed and by requiring
the enumeration of the alleged grounds for the imposition of
sanctions will ~eparate the merits of the pending motion from the
attempt to censure counsel and/or client by imposing sanctions.
Such a rule will also prevent the "add-on" of a sanctions
application to a motion opposition, a practice which may not give
the opposing party adequate opportunity to prepare and present a
rebuttal to the Section 128.5 claim. California Rules of Court
317(a) provides that any opposition to a motion shall be filed
not later than five days before the noticed hearing, and any
reply not later than two days before.
If a sanctions application
is first noticed in an opposition then the party addressed by
that application may not have sufficient time to present an
adequate rebuttal. The rebuttal, furthermore, necessarily will
be embedded in the reply memorandum submitted on the substantive
motion.
Thank you again for the invitation to appear before the
Committee.

?irul~

Richar~L.

RLF:mg
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012
CHAMBERS OF
NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, JUDGE

September 9, 1987

Honorable Elihu M. Harris
Chairman, California Legislature
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
P. 0. Box 942849
Sacramento, California 94249-0001
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
Tnank you for inviting my review and response to
the AB 493, AB 1252 and AB 1914 regarding sanctions for
bad faith and frivolous actions and tactics. 1 respond,
of course, only for myself; 1 do not speak for the
Superior Court or any of its committees, nor of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association or any of its committees or
constituent groups.
That disclaimer over, let me turn to the merits.
AB 245: 1 think the change in Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5 proposed in this bill is well
merited. If an action is taken in bad faith, it should be
sufficient that it does cause unnecessary delay; it should
not be necessary to establish that such delay was the only
purpose of the actions or tactics.
AB 1252: I see serious problems in this bill, as
now written. It would appear to restrict the present
broad scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 to
personal injury and wrongful death litigation. 1 can see
no reason for excepting sanctions for frivolous motions,
etc. in other cases.
I'm not sure that a restatement of "frivolous" is
needed; present section 128.5 (especially if modified as
proposed in AB 245) seems to be entirely adequate, and has
now received a considerable case law gloss.
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2.

Finally, I note the change that deletes
"reasor..able expenees" ,gs the principle ma::.swre fot· fees.
In its place, the bill appears to authorize a kind of
fine--i.e., a penalty that would more than make the moving
party whole. On the other hand, a $10,000 cap would be
enacted, preventing a court from making a party whole in
the rare case in which expenses caused by a bad faith
tactic exceed $10,000. (Such matters are rare, but I have
seen them.) And it is not clear if the $10,000 is an
aggregate amount for all frivolous actions by all
respondents.

AB 1914: This measure appears to adopt the
federal practice for state court proceedings. I think
that is a good idea, although I would like to know more
about how the federal rule was worked out.
I hope this is useful.

Sincerely yours,

?/

/'

NLE:pp
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September 18, 1987

Ms. Deborah M. DeBow
Senior Consultant
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
state Capitol
P. o. Box 942849
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
In Re:

AB 1252, AB 1914

Dear Ms. DeBow:
I write in response to the letter to me from Elihu M.
Harris, Esq., Chair, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary.
I cannot be available to provide testimony on these
bills. However I have a few comments that you may wish to draw
to the attention of the Committee.
Although I am sympathetic to the concerns that clearly
prompted these measures, I do not agree that these bills will
have the positive effects that their sponsors hope to achieve.
The purpose is to do something about court congestion and delay
in the judicial system. As you know, provisions for sanctions
for bad faith activities already exist in both the state and the
federal systems. The results of the imposition of such sanctions
has been almost uniformly discouraging.
I commend to the attention of the Committee the
sophisticated study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice,
6
Managing the Unmanageable: A History of Civil Delay in the Los
Angeles Superior Court, 6 especially at pages 73-89 (1984). The
documented conclusion of that study is as follows:
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"Yet despite the Court's determined efforts
in this regard in its faith that some of
these procedures will result in a long-term
reduction in delay, we have found no such
long-term effect on the time-to-trial figures
as a result of their imposition. As with the
addition of judicial manpower, the imposition
of these procedures could well have prevented
or tempered subsequent increases in delay •••
but overall, the wait-to-trial continued
upward i~ the Los Angeles Superior Court,
particularly since the mid-1930's."
The underlying assumption of sanction rules and
statutes is that congestion and delay are at least partially
caused by dilatory lawyers and by the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. Some lawyers are dilatory and some lawsuits are
frivolous, but the amount of litigation engendered by such
practices is a trivial part of the caseload. As the Rand
Institute study makes indelibly clear the basic problem is that
as the population has escalated in the major urban centers of
California, the demand for judicial services has exceeded the
supply. When the problem is traffic jams on a freeway, it does
not speed up the traffic to make cars move up faster on the onramp. No matter how well intentioned proposals for sanctions
have been (and they have always been well intentioned), the end
product is to increase the amount of judicial time that must be
spent per case to administer a sanctions program and since
judicial time is the scarcest resource, the results are usually
contrary to the draftmen's intent. Moreover, it is undeniable
that imposing sanctions on lawyers increases the cost of delivery
of legal services.
I am opposed to these bills because, in my opinion, the
result will be to increase, rather than decrease, congestion and
delay in the California courts.

SMH:sh
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Ms. Deborah M. DeBow
Senior Consultant
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
Post Office Box 942849
Sacramento, California 94249-0001
Dear Ms. DeBow:
Chairman Harris, by his letter of 1 September,
requested my comments on Assembly Bills Numbers 245,
1252 and 1914. I write in my capacity as an individual
lawyer, not as a member of my firm. My background is
as a lawyer who specializes in the field of legal malpractice and professional responsibility. I am the author
of a treatise, Legal Malpractice, which will be published
in the third editi~n by West Publishing within the next few
months. I have also been Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Laywers• Professional Liability and am a present
member of the Standing Committee on Lawyer Competence.
Thus, in my practice and professional activities, I have
become very familiar with the subject of attorney sanctions. I will not be available, however, for the interim
hearing on the 18th of September.
I enclose as a research source, and not for
republication because of the restricted copyright, draft
materials of Sections 69.1-69.5, which will appear as part
of the third edition of Legal Malpractice. The principal
focus of the materials concerns the rapidly developing
and confused application of Federal Rule 11. The federal
court experience in the sanctions area proceeds upon the
premise that the sanction power is salutory by eliminating
unmeritorious and unreasonable claims, procedures and
tactics. There has been a literal flood of litigation
concerning the interpretation of Rule 11. For the lawyers,
the uncertainty has created concern and risk since difference rules have been applied in different circuits.
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There are many unanswered questions, such as the degree
to which lawyers can continue to rely upon their clients
for facts and whether they can trust what clients say.
A major justification for Rule 11 is the perception that the poor quality of claims and tactical
activities can be controlled by imposing sanctions upon
lawyers. Those sanctions have been very substantial and
are typically not covered by lawyers' professional liability
insurance. The countervailing concerns are twofold. First
is the cost of sanctions to the legal profession. Second
is the concern that lawyers' reaction to the threat of
sanctions will be not to pursue otherwise meritorious claims
or approaches out of personal concern. Unfortunately, we
are still years away in terms of experience from being able
to evaluate the impact of the countervailing justifications
and concerns. A reality, however, is that whatever litigation or tactics have been deterred by sanctions, there
has been a substantial replacement with litigation over the
propriety and meaning of those sanctions.
The California experience has been relatively
minimal. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has focused
upon a subjective standard which requires the presence of
bad faith or a total lack of merit. Thus, as a deterrent,
Section 128.5 has dealt essentially with the most blatant
abuses. If the purpose of Section 128.5 is to improve the
quality of claims and litigation, then it has failed. If
the sole purpose is to deal with extreme abuses, then Code
of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has served that purpose.
In reviewing the three proposed pieces of legislation, I comment as follows. I address first Assembly
Bill Number 1252 because, in my opinion, it is the most
inappropriate piece of legislation. First, for reasons
not explained, the legislation is limited to "personal
injury or death" actions. There is much litigation involving contracts and economic issues which seem meaningless to exclude from the ambit of the proposal. The
$10,000 limit is arbitrary and does not appear to have
a counterpart in any other legislation I have seen in the
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United States. Subdivision (c) is illogical. Although
Subdivision {a) talks about "frivolous claims or defenses,"
Subdivision (c) requires a finding that "the entire case
or defense" was frivolous. Thus, while the statute purports to provide sanctions for a frivolous claim, sanctions
cannot lie unless the entire case was frivolous. The provisions are not only inconsistent but illogical. Injury
caused by a frivolous, coercive claim or a singular defense
exists regardless of whether the entire proceeding is or is
not meritorious. In my opinion, Assembly Bill Number 1252
is inappropriate and so inartfully drafted as to likely
engender significant litigation regarding its meaning.
Assembly Bill Number 245 is an evolutionary refinement of Section 128.5. It appears to sharpen the statute's application by no longer requiring that the wrongful
actions be solely intended to cause delay but merely cause
delay. I see the change as minor both in legal effect and
practical impact.
Assembly Bill Number 1914 adds Code of Civil
Procedure Section 447, which brings into play a California
counterpart of Rule 11. If AB 1914 were adopted, then Code
of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 would be redundant, perhaps
inconsistent, and create confusion which would warrant the
repeal of that section. On the positive side, the construction of Section 447 would be aided by a huge body of federal
law on Rule 11. The California experience would then follow
the federal courts, with the first consequence being the
frequent application of the sanction rules, followed by a
great increase in appellate review.
In summary, my opinion is that Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.5 has had minimal impact upon the
practice of law or the nature of litigation in California
since it is designed to deal only with blatant abuses. In
contrast, Rule 11 and the proposed comparable legislation
in California is likely to have significant impact upon
the quality of litigation and the style and cost of the
practice of law. The unresolved issue remains whether
the benefits of a Rule 11 approach outweigh the adverse
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consequences. As a short-term solution, Rule 11 does appear
to achieve salutary objectives. I remain uncertain about
the long-term effects.
September.

I will be out of the country until the 28th of
If I can be of further assistance, please advise.
Sincerely,

Ronald E. Mallen
REM/dap
Enclosures
cc: Elihu M., Harris
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COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814

Roger K. Warren, Judge

September 15, 1987

Honorable Elihu M. Harris
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
Post Office Box 942849
Sacramento, California 94249-0001
Attention:

Ms. Deborah M. DeBow, Senior Consultant

Re:

Interim Hearing on Attorney Sanctions;
AB 245 (Harris), AB 1252 (Zeltner), and
AB 1914 (Harris)

Dear Assemblyman Harris:
The California Judges Association (CJA) supports the changes in
the law of sanctions proposed in Assembly Bill 245 (Harris) and
Assembly Bill 1914 (Harris) • CJA believes that such legislation will
enhance the ability of the courts to regulate improper conduct of
parties and counsel.
CJA opposes Assembly Bill 1252 (Zeltner). The bill repeals the
existing provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, which is
the principal statutory basis for attorney sanctions in non-discovery
matters. Inexplicably, the proposed Section 128.5 would apply only in
actions for personal injury or death.
CJA's Civil Law and Procedure Committee will be meeting in Los
Angeles on September 22. Noting your solicitation from us of written
legislative proposals consistent with the intent of the three pending
bills, I will communicate any further comments or proposals on the
subject to the Assembly Committee as shortly thereafter as possible.
Thank you very much for soliciting our views on this subject.
Very truly yours,

/c::-:!wARFEN, Chair
California Judges Association
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure
RKN/nsv
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Agenda
Public Hearing
on
Sanctions Against Attorneys and Parties
for Frivolous and Bad Faith
Actions or Tactics

1100 J STREET. FIFTH FLO
SACRAMENTO. CA 9581
LLOYD CONNELLY
CHAIRMAN
STAFF
GENE ERBIN
COUNSEL
ROSEMARY SANCHEZ
SECRETARY

Friday, September 18, 1987
9:15 a.m. to 1:00 p.m
The Beverly Hilton Hotel
The Royal Suite
9876 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA

9:15

Opening Comments by the Chair and Committee Members

9:30

Ho\tlard Dickstein
Kanter, Merin, Dickstein, & Kirk
Sacramento, CA
General Counsel for "Little Hoover" Commission

10:00

Richard L. Fruin, Jr.
Lawler, Felix & Hall
Los Angeles, CA
Author of articles relating to sanctions.

10:30

Lynne Yates-Carter
Attorney at Law
San Jose, CA
Legislative Coordinator, Family Law Section
State Bar of California
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MEMORANDUM
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LLOYD CONNELLY
CHAIRMAN
STAFF

TO:

INTERESTED PERSONS

FROM:

Elihu M. Harris, Chair
Assembly Committee on Judiciary

DATE:

September 15, 1987

RE:

Interim Hearing on Attorney Sanctions
State Bar Convention

GENE ERBIN
COUNSEL
ROSEMARY SANCHEZ
SECRETARY

Friday, September 18, 1987
9:15 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
The Beverly Hilton Hotel
The Royal Suite
9876 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA
Enclosed is the informational packet for the Interim Hearing on
September 18, 1987.
will be addressing issues presented in AB 245 (Harris),
AB 1252 (Zeltner}, and AP 1914 (Harris) pertaining to sanctions
against attorneys and parties for frivolous and bad faith actions
or tactics.

W~

Included in the packet for purposes of comparison are SB 379
(Presley), which limits the provisions also contained in A~ 1914
to a 5-year pilot project to commence in Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties, and SB 379 (Ellis), chaptered in 1985, which
amended the sanction provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.5 (see AB 245). The packet also contains
correspondence and other relevant information to facilitate
discussion at the hearing.
We have solicited for the purposes of discussion at this hearing
(a) written legislative proposals consistent with the intent of
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INTERESTED PERSONS

-2-

September 15, 1987

the pending bills; (b) persons with expertise in the area of
attorney sanctions ~ho are interested in responding critically to
the pending bills and/or any written legislative proposals: and
(c) other written materials, articles, or comments with regards
to the pending legislation or general area of attorney sanctions.
Please direct questions to: Deborah M. DeBow, Senior Consultant,
Assembly Committee on Judiciary, State Capitol, P.O. Box 942849,
Sacramento, California, 94249-0001, (916) 445-4560.
EMH:mea
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CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 128.5. [Payment of expenses attribut·
able to bad faith actions or frivolous or
delaying tactics] (a) Every trial court may
order a party, the party's attorney, or both
to pay any reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by another party as
a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that
are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay. This section also applies
to judicial arbitration proceedings under
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section
1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) ..Actions or tactics" include, but are

not limited to, the making or opposing of
motions or the filing and service of a complaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing of
a complaint without service thereof on an
opposing party does not constitute "actions
or tactics" for purposes of this section.
(2) .. Frivolous" means (A) totally and
completely without merit or (B) for the sole
purpose of harassing an opposing party.
(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall
not be imposed except on notice contained
in a party's moving or responding papers; or
the court's own motion, after notice and
opportunity to be hc:ard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
(d) The liability imposed by this section is
in addition to any other liability imposed by
law for acts or omissions within the purview
nf this section. Amended Stats 1985 ch 296
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§ 177. Powers of judicial officers as to
conduct of proceedings. Every judicial officer
shall have power:
I. To preserve and enforce order in his
imm~iate presence, and in proceedings before h1m, when he is engaged in the performance of official duty;
·
2. To compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided in this code;
3: T~ compel the attendance of persons to
testify m a proceeding before him, in the
cases and manner provided in this code;
4. To administer oaths to persons in a
proceeding pending before him, and in all
other cases where it may be necessary in the
exercise of his powers and duties. [1872;
1880 ch 35 § 1.) Cal Jur 3d Affidavits and
D~larations Under Penalty of Perjury § 10,
Ev1dence § 405; Witkin Procedure (3d)
Courts§§ 137, 138.
§ 177.5. [Power to impose sanctions for
violations of lawful orders] A judicial officer
shall have the power to impose reasonable
money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any
~ther provision. of.l~w. payable to the county
m wh1ch the JUdiCial officer is located for
any violation of a lawful court order bY. a
person, done without good cause or substantial justification. This power shall not apply
to ~dvocacy of counsel before the court. For
the purposes of this section, the term .. person" includes a witness, a party, a party's
attorney, or both.
Sanctions pursuant to this section shall
not be imposed except on notice contained

in a party's moving or responding papers; or
on the court's own motion, after notice and
opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order. [1982 ch 1564 § 1.] Witkin
Procedure (3d) Courts § 141; Trial§ 67.
§ 178. [Power] to punish for contempt.
For the effectual exercise of the powers
conferred by the last section, a judicial officer may punish for contempt in the cases
··provided in this code. [1872; 1880 ch 35
§ 1.) 14 Cal Jur 3d Contempt § 4.
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§ 907. [Costs on frivolous or delaying
appeal.] When it appears to the reviewing
court that the appeal was frivolous or taken
solely for delay, it may add to the costs on
appeal such damages as may be just. [1968
ch 385 § 2; former § 907 repealed 1933 ch
744 § 198.] Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review
§§ 581, 601, 680, 705; Cal Practice Rev Ch
53 Planning After Trial; Cal Practice § 61 :2;
Witkin Procedure (3d) Appeal §§ 18, 532,
533, 535.

"

Existing CCP 128. 5

am

DESCRIProRS

AB 245 (Harris)

1)

Code section
:lltpacted:

OCP 128.5 amended.

2)

Civil penalty: Unspecified.

3)

Civil
sancticn:

Reasooable expenses
including attorney fees.

ISSOES

AB 1252 (zeltner)

ISSOES

AB 1914 (Harris) and
*SB 379 (Presl~)

OCP 128.5 amended
to add:

CCP 447 added.

Up to $10,000 penalty.

"AWJ:Cpriate sanction"
Penalty unspecified.

Attorney fees & costs.
ShcW.d there be
a penalty in
excess of expenses?

~le

expenses,

including attorney fees.

4)

Sanction :imParty, attorney or both.
p::>sed against:

Attorney or party.

Attorney or party.

5)

Types of cases All act:ials including
saJ'¥:tion is
arbi trati.cn.
ctR?licable:

Persooal injury/wrongful
death

All actions.

6)

Conditioos
for ctR?lying
sanction:

-!'-!'-

Bad faith act:ials or tactics

that are frivolous or that
are solely i.nt:eD3ed to
cause unnecessary delay.

Sb:Juld this provision read "not
done in good
faith"?

AB 245 deletes "solely inAre "delay" protended" so as to pemi.t
vi.sions too
sanctions to he inp:)sed when bread? Shoold
an action or tactic causes
statute need
unnecessary delay.
"intent"?
ShcW.d statute
:retain "solely
i.ntellded"to
cause delay?

Frivolous llDtions
or
asserting frivolous claims
or defenses
or
causing unnecessary delay.

.

Unclear i f <XDplaints are
included.

Plead:i.nq, llDtians or other
paper signed certified after
reasonable inprl.ry, that it
is well~ in fact and
war.ranted by existing law
or a good faith azgument for
extension/md:i.ficaticn or
reversal of existing law and
not interposed for illproper
~.

ISSUES

Existing OCP 128 • 5
and
DESC'RIPIDRS

7)

Definitims
far applicatioo of
sanctions:

J\B 245 (Harris)

.Actims/tactics defined as
JIDtims or
filing & service of a:mplaint. & ~laint.
Frivoloos defined as totally
& ~etely Wit'Jla.Jt merit
or far sole purpose of harass.

rnalti.rw:;/q.poslJ1ii

ISSUES

J\B 1252 (Zeltner)

Defines frivolous notioo,
claim or defense as:
a) made in bad faith either
for prolonging or delaying
litigation and to harass
Should not "and"
another party, or,
be "or"?

made wi tha1t any reasooable basis in law or fact. and
lacking any good faith~
ment for an extension, roodification or reversal of
existir¥] law.
b)

When sanction
may be
ilrp:leed:

8)

Specifies hearing upon notice.
Requires order to specify
ccnduct.

ISSUES

Court may assess sanctions

at the t.inw:! it rules on
110tion, claim or defense or
at t.inw:! of judgment, i f i t
finds entire case or
defense

AR 1914 (Harris) and
*SB 379 (Presley)

Specifies :iJiprqJer purpose as:
to harass or cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in
cost. Failure to certify
requires strikinq of the
JIDtioo or other paper.
Certified in violatioo
subjects party or attorney
to sanctioos.

R> indicatioo as to when
court: assesses sanction.

Caments:

.~"-

"'

When a party coo.l.d havP. set a
not!~ in 21 days b:rt sets it in
six weeks, should sanctims be
available?

If both parties act. together to
delay a case, should the court:
have the power to .iapose sanctims
oo both parties? Who is to receive
the proceeds ftall the sanction in
this situatioo?

Shoold not the
requ.irEment of
notice and hearing oo the IIDtion
be specified in
the statute.

was frivolous.

other:

9)

ISSUES

*1987 - to enrollment.

I.'RGISLATIVF HISTORY

The Legislature added Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5
(CCP 128.5) in 1981 to give trial court judges the power to
impose sanctions against attorneys who pursue bad faith tactics
or actions which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay.
The courts [Baugess v. Paine (1978) 22 3d 626] determined that
the power to assess sanct1ons was not an inherent power of the
court.
Proponents of the original bill (SB 947) asserted that frivolous
motions consumed court time and increased litigation costs.
Opponents feared that such ability to sanction would inhibit the
proper advocacy by counsel.
In 1984, CCP 128.5 was amended to apply to arbitration
proceedings.
(AB 2752)
The 1985 amendments (SB 379) to CCP 128.5 recast the basis for
imposing sanctions and defined "actions or tactics" and
"frivolous." The application of CCP 128.5 to the filing and
service of a complaint or cross-complaint was specified.
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ASSEMBLY COMMIITEE ON
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman

JUDICI.AJ~:.

Prepared by
R. LeBov

BILL:

SB 947
(As amended 8/18/81)

AUTHOR:

Davis

HEARING DATE: 8/26/81
SEN. JUD. COY~. VOTE: (5-0)
SENATE FLOOR VOTE: (31-0)

SUBJECT:
This bill is intended to give trial courts the statutory
authority to award attorneys' fees as sanctions.
ANALYSIS:
The California Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to
its supervisory power, a trial court may "take appropriate
action to secure compliance with its orders, to punish contempt, and to control its proceedings" but that, absent
statutory authority, a court may not award attorneys' fees
as a sanction under its supervisory power.
[Baugess v
Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626 (1978)]
This bill would authorize a trial court to require a party
or the party's attorney, or both,-to pay any reasonable
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by another
party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good
faith which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay.
STAFF COMMENTARY:
1.

In Bauguess, the Supreme Court held that if trial
courts had "the inherent power to impose sanctions
in the form of attorney's fees for alleged misconduct, trial courts would be given a power without
procedural limits and potentially subject to abuse."
The court cited Young v Redman (55 Cal. App. 3d 827)
in which the Court of Appeal observed that "such power
in the trial court, unfettered and unbridled, without appropriate safeguards and guidelines could cancel
(CONTINUED)
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SB 947

HEARING DATE: 8/26/81

any b~nefits derived to the judicial process by generating a proliferation of appeals" and that therefore
"[Any) power of the trial court to impose such sanctions
should be created by the legislative branch of government with appropriate safeguards and guidelines developed following a thorough indepth investigation."
Does this bill contain such appropriate safeguards
and guidelines or is it potentially subject to abuse?
2.

Judge Weil of the Los Angeles Superior Court states
that his court's "law and motion departments.are
cluttered up with (frivolous) motions that consume
vasts amounts of judicial time and require unnecessary
and espensive appearances to bemade by lawyers resisting these motions." He therefore urges enactment
of this bill in order to "empower the trial court judge
to impose sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees in
favor of parties who must resist frivolous motions
brought solely for the purpose of delay.

3.

Opponents of this bill fear that authorizing trial
courts to award attorneys' fees as a sanction could
imperil the independence of the bar and inhibit zealous
advocacy by counsel. In this regard the American
Civil Liberties Union points out that raising all
possible motions is part of an atto"rney's responsibility of serving his or her client. The ACLU further
states that "Determination as to whether a motion is
frivolous is subject to abuse of judicial discretion.
If a motion has .been denied, a judge might be more
susceptible to a determination that such a motion was
frivolous. Furthermore, some attorneys might be inclined to use motions for sanctions as a delaying
tactic.
"In many instances, judges already have the discretion
to grant or deny hearings on motions. ~Tiere it is
determined that a motion is frivolous, the judge is
free to deny the hearing. Attorneys also may bring
motions for sanctions now. If the motions have merit,
sanctions can be awarded."
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AB 2752, as introduced, Harris. Judicial arbitration.
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party or the
party's attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses
incurred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not
based on good faith which are frivolous or cause unnecessary
delay, as specified.
This bill would make those provisions also applicable in
judicial arbitration proceedings.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no .
State-mandated local program: no .
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LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
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SECTION 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is amended to read:
128.5. (a) Every trial court shall have the power to
order a party or the party's attorney, or both, to pay any
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
by another party as a result of tactics or actions not based
on good faith which are frivolous or which cause
unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying tactics
include, but are not limited to, making or opposing
motions without good faith. This section also applies to
judicial arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5
(commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3.
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(b) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be
imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving
or responding papers; or the courfs own motion, after
notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the
conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M. BARRIS, Chairman
AB 2752 (Harris)

AB 2752

As introduced 02/07/84

SUBJECT
This bill is intended to permit the imposition of costs and
attorneys' fees when frivolous actions or delaying tactics are
used in judicial arbitration.
DIGEST

•

Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party or the
party's attorney or both to pay reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by another party as a result of tactics
or actions, not based on good faith, which are frivolous or which
cause unnecessary delay.
This bill would specifically provide that the provisions
authorizing imposition of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees
for frivolous acts or delaying would apply to judicial
arbitration proceedings.
STAFF COMMENTS
1.

The State Bar and the Judicial Council are joint sponso~s of
this bill. It is their position that some parties are
abusing the judicial arbitration process by either failing to
participate in the hearings or by utilizing delaying tactics
during the arbitration proceedings. The sources suggest that
such conduct defeats the purpose of judicial arbitration
(i.e. expeditious resolution of the case).
wnile. the sources suggest that a court currently may have the
power to impose the sanctions authorized by Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.5 for dilatory tactics used in judicial
arbitration, they believe that this bill is necessary to
remove all doubt.

3.

This bill would specifically authorize a court to impose
costs, including an opponent's attorneys' fees, against a
party or the party's attorney, for tactics or actions used in
arbitration proceedings which are not based on good faith and
are frivolous or cause unnecessary delay. However, these
sections may not be imposed unless the affected party has
been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Further,
the order imposing the sanction must be in writing and recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
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Page 1

2.

The courts have held that despite a party's wilful refusal to
appear at an arbitration proceeding, that party has an
established right to a trial de novo (or court trial) after
the arbitration award has been filed.
(See Herbert v Hain,
153 Ca.App.3d 465 (1982). This bill, contends the sources,
may "ameliorate the unfairness" that results when a party
requests a trial de novo after failing to appear and
participate in a judicial arbitration hearing. The bill,
argue the sources, would permit a court to force the party
who fails to appear at arbitration hearings to bear the
burden of costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the party who
attended and prevailed at the hearing.
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Pase :

SOURCE
State Bar of California
Judicial Council
SUPPORT
Cal-Tax
OPPOSITION

Unknown
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Senate Bill No. 379
CHAPTER 296
An act to amend Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
relating to civil actions.
[Approved by Governor July 26, 1985. Filed with
Secretary of State July 29, 1985.)
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 379, Ellis. Sanctions for bad-faith judicial actions.
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the party's
attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses incurred by another
party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good faith which
are frivolous or cause unnecessary delay, as specified. Existing law
also provides separate actions for abuse of judicial process and
malicious prosecution.
This bill would revise the above provisions for award of expenses
by making these provisions applicable to bad-faith tactics or actions
which are intended to cause unnecessary delay or are employed
solely to harass an opposing party or are totally and completely
without merit, rather than tactics or actions which cause unnecessary
delay. The bill would define "actions and tactics" to include, but not
be limited to, the making or opposing of motions and the filing and
service of a complaint or cross-complaint. "Actions and tactics"
would not include the mere filing of a complaint without service
upon an opposing party.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTIO!\ 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
amended to read:
128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's
attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith
actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial arbitration
proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10)
of Title 3 of Part 3.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to, the making
or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or
cross-complaint. The mere filing of a complaint without service
thereof on an opposing party does not constitute "actions or tactics"
for purposes of this section.
(2) "Frivolous" means (A) totally and completely without merit
or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.
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(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except
on notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the
court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An
order imposing expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail
the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
(d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other
liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of
this section.

0
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Date of Hearing:

June 11, 1985

SB 379

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman
SB 379 (Ellis) - As Amended:

June 20, 1985

PRIOR ACTION
Sen. Jud. Com. 7-0

•

Sen. Floor 38-0

SUBJECT: This bill revises the authority of a court to impose sanctions for
tactics or actions which are not done in good faith and are frivolous or cause
delay .
DIGEST
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the party's attorney,
or both to pay reasonable expenses incurred by another party as a result of
tactics or actions not based on good faith, which are frivolous or cause
unnecessary delay.
Existino law also provides separate actions for abuse of judicial process and
malicious prosecution, and grants courts the power to impose contempt sanctions
for the misconduct of attorneys or parties.
This bill:
1)

Deletes the statutory language which permits an award of expenses
resulting from tactics or actions not based on good faith which cause
unnecessary delay;

2)

Authorizes an award of expenses resulting from tactics or actions
brought in bad faith which are solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay;

3)

Defines dCtions and tactics as including the filing and serving of a
complaint or cross-complaint, but excludes a complaint or
cross-complaint filed but not served;

4)

Defines a frivolous action or tactic as one brought solely to harass or
which is totallj and completely without merit.

FISCAL EFFECT
None

- continued - 57 -
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COMMENTS
1. The existing statute, Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 128.5, does:

2.

(a)

Not specify that sanctions may be imposed by the trial court for filing
of a frivolous complaint or cross-complaint or for filing a complaint
or cross-complaint which causes unnecessary delay.

(b)

Not specifically permit imposition of a penalty for tactics, actions,
or the filing of a complaint/cross-complaint which may be intended to
cause delay but, in fact, causes no delay.

(c)

Permit imposition of a penalty for tactics or actions, not based on
good faith, which cause unnecessary delay.

(d)

Specify that reimbursement may be ordered by the trial court for
reasonable expenses incurred in defending against tactics or actions
which are frivolous and not based on good faith.

According to the sponsor, this bill is needed to deter a party and/or
attorney from filing frivolous complaints or cross-complaints. It is argued
that when such conduct is in bad faith, the party and/or attorney
perpetrating the conduct should be liable for any reasonable expenses (e.g.~
attorneys' fees) incurred by the other party.
Proponents state that there are limited remedies for bogus complaints. The
pursuit of a malicious prosecution action, although an available remedy, is
costly, time-consuming, subject to a difficult standard of proof for
damages, and emotionally traumatic to the plaintiff. Further, it may be
difficult to locate an attorney willing to pursue a malicious prosecution
action. Usually the plaintiff merely desires to be reimbursed his/her
expenses incurred in defending against the underlying unmeritorious
complaint, which this bill would permit.

3.

Current provisions of law provide both courts and parties alternative
methods of redress in instances of deliberate malfeasance. Causes of action
are available, such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process, which
have evolved standards to preserve and protect a person's right to access to
the courts, while permitting another to collect damages for abuse and misuse
of the litigation process. Alternatively, courts have discretion to impose
contempt sanctions for misconduct of an attorney or party.

5.

The statute currently uses the standard of "not based on good faith" in
determining the appropriateness for awarding expenses. This standard is
undefined, broad and vague. Thus, this bill requires that such tactics or
- continued SB 379
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actions must be found to be done in bad faith prior to the imposition of
sanctions. Such amendment would likely reduce the chilling effect on
parties who wish to exercise appropriate litigation rights.
This bill also defines frivolous actions or tactics to be those which are
brought solely to harass the opposing party or which are totally and
completely without merit.
The "bad faith" standard and definition of frivolous are consistent with
case law interpreting Code of Civil Procedure Section 907, which assesses
sanctions for frivolous appeals. In In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31
Cal.3d 637, the California Supreme Court disallowed the sanctions that the
court of appeal had imposed on an attorney under Code of Civil Procedure
Section 907 and Rule 26(a) for pursuing a frivolous appeal. The Supreme
Court pointed out that there was no clear definition of the concept
"frivolous ... The court suggested that a carefully framed definition,
"surrounded by procedural protections and sparingly applied ..• can serve the
important purpose of penalizing the most egregious conduct without deterring
valid appellate claims." The court further stated that "an appeal should be
held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to
harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment or when tt
indisputably has no merit ... "
The court in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stockton Port Dist.
(1983) 140 Cal .App.3d 111, 116, stated: "The fact that an action is
determined to be 'without merit' does not, a fortiori, place it in the
category of frivolous .•. Obviously, where an action is initiated for an
improper motive, or a party knows or should know the facts or law or both
preclude the action or any recovery, yet prosecutes the action in any event,
the question of a frivolous action is raised ... The Legislature did not
intend, however, to chill the valid assertion of a litigant's rights against
a public entity or any other defendant. For this reason, it is clear
sanctions should not be imposed except in the clearest of cases." (Citing
Flaherty)
6.

This bill also authorizes the court to impose sanctions upon the filing and
serving of a complaint or cross-complaint which was solely intended to cause
delay. The mere filing of a complaint or cross-complaint (e.g., to protect
the statute of limitations), without service of the complaint or
cross-complaint, will not subject such party to sanctions under Civil
Procedure Code Section 128.5.
However, the discovery statutes restrict commencement of discovery (e.g.,
interrogatories, depositions, subpoenas) until after service of the
complaint, thus limiting plaintiff's ability to investigate and to determine
the merit of a claim.
- continued SB 379
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7. Although taking no position on this bill, the Attorney General notes that:
The potential effect of these changes is not clear. Current law allows
sanctions for actions and tactics which either cause unnecessary delay
or are frivolous: the bill would apparently delete the possibility of
sanctions where unnecessary delay was in fact caused, and allow them
only if delay was intended. As phrased, a court thus would apparently
have no power to order sanctions where unintentional unnecessary delay
was in fact caused.
Moreover, the bill would require a judge to determine the subjective
purpose of a party, rather than determining only the effect of the
action or tactic; it thus may in practice lessen the possibility of
sanctions, since subjective intent is difficult to prove. Actual delay
is at least objectively recognizable. In addition, any action or
tactic which is intended to cause unnecessary delay probably is already
subject to sanction as "frivolous," and it is difficult to see what the
new language adds.
Support

Opposition

County Supervisors Association of
California

American Civil Liberties Union
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AMERICAN CNIL LII3EP.TIES UNION
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE OFFICE
1127 11th Street. Suite 602 0
Sacramento. California 95814
Telephone (916) 442-1 036 0

June 10, 1985
Members
Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, California 95814
Re:

·~B

379 (Amended)tlppose

Dear Members:
Please be advised that the ACLU opposes SB 379 which seeks
to expand the grounds upon which an attorney or party may be
sanctioned for bad faith in civil proceedings.
The current provisions of law provide both courts and parties
adequate methods of redress in instances of deliberate malfeasance.
However. the additional authority proposed in SB 379 would authorize
the levying of what are essentially punitive damages against a
party or counsel for the filing of a civil complaint or crosscomplaint. Such action by counsel may be appropriate and to act otherwise may constitute actionable malpractice. Particularly in
cases of police abuse, both ci vi 1 and criminal defense counsel
may be dissuaded from fully representing a client's interests.
In its present form, SB 379 allows for an award of punitive
damages where tactics or actions "are intended to caus~ unnecessary
delay". This standard is vague and may include through its overbreadth actions which lead to postponements that are entirely
justified on the basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The proposed rule would also allow opposing counsel
to 'second guess' the moving party. It is not clear whether this
bill would allow opposing counsel to challenge a delay that had
been granted or that had been denied before or after the actual
trial proceeding. We are also concerned that because of the intent standard, an attorney may be required to divulge information
and strategy that could not otherwise be required for disclosure
because of work-product rules.
We feel that such precedent is both dangerous and unnecessary.
The proposed rule may discourage attorneys from accepting cases
that may require the filing of complaints and cross-complaints.
And, it would also penalize those who acted at the direction of
a client with a bona fide belief that the filing of such an action
was appropriate and necessary to gain legal redress.
Daphne L. Macklin. legislative Advocate • MarJorie C Swartz. legislative Advocate • Rita M. Egri. legislative Assistant
AQU of Northern California • Dorothy M Ehrlich. Executive Director AQU ci Southern California • P.omono Ripston. Executive Director
166J Mission Street. Su1te 460•Son Fronosco. 94100•(415)621-2493 6JJ South Shatto Place • los Angeles. 90005 • (21 J) 487-1720
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Given these concerns, we see no basis for amending the
current law and urge tbat you vote ag~inst this proposal.
Respectfully,

·-u
?L"-~t.k
D~~E L. MACKLIN

Legislative Advocate

/lt~;·c-.d

t

~ch

MARJORIE C. SWARTZ
Legislative Advocate
cc: Consultant, Assembly Judiciary Committee
senator Jfm Ellfs ·
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ANALYST:

DATE:

(

PHONE:

Richard C. Jacobs

April 18, 1985
(8)

597-0285
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Tt0 law allrn:ing sanctions for frivolous actions or tactics
cr those ~h~ch cause unnecessary delay in litigation ought
to be clear so that th~ trial courts can use it effectively.
T1d s bill introduces cor1fusing language, and may in fact be
counterproductive.

DP.

(
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DIGEST
Appeals: Sanctions
\mends Code of Civil Procedure section 907 to require notice and a written recitation of
JUdicial justification when sanctions for a frivolous or dilatory appeal are imposed.

(

RESOLUTIONS COMMITIEE REPORT
Recommend APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE
Reasons:
This resolution would require that the imposition of sanctions for a frivolous or
dilatory appeal must be with notice and that the court must issue a detailed written
order reciting the basis for the sanctions. The resolution would protect against
abuses of the sanctions power without changing the substantive basis for awarding
sanctions.
The proponent cites two major reasons for the proposed amendment: (1) under
current law, courts may impose sanctions ,without any esgep~le basis; and (2)
under current law, sanctions may be imposed for an appeal taken as a oelaying
tactic even though the appeal is not frivolous.

I

The proposed amendment is desirable in that it would require the appellate court to
recite in detail the circumstances justifying the award and the basis on which the
court arrived at the amount of the award. Such a requirement would aid the
Supreme Court, in those instances in which a petition for hearing is granted, in
determining whether an award of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section
907 was appropriate.

(

~

'

However, the proposed amendment would not, as the proponent suggests, affect the
: appellate courts' present ability to award sanctions where an appeal is taken solely
\
' / for purposes of delay, but is not frivolous. The proposed amendment, patterned
f. after Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, specifically provides that sanctions
1U '
may be awarded as a result of actions not based on good faith which are frivolous or
'
which cause unnecessary delay. Thus, the basis for imposing sanctions remains the
same under present Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and the proposed
amendment.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* *

SECTION/COMMITTEE REPOR'IS
COMMITTEE ON ADMimSTRATION OF JUSTICE
Recommend APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE
Reasons:
Present law allows an appellate court to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals or delays. This
proposal clarifies the procedures to be used by appellate courts in imposing such sanctions, by
adopting the procedures applicable to trial courts under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.
The same result could be achieved by repealing Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and
amending section 128.5 to make it applicable to "trial or appellate courts."

/

(
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TEXT OF RESOLUTION

RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates recommends that Legislation
be sponsored to amend Section 907 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
read as follows:
1

2
3

4
5
6
7
B
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

(_
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S907
(a} The reviewing court shall have the power to order a
party to pay reasonable expenses or damages, or both, including
attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of
tactics or actions not based on good faith which are frivolous
or which cause unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying
tactics include, but are not limited to, taking or opposing an
appeal without good faith.
(b) No award pursuant to this section shall be imposed
except on notice contained in a party's moving or responding
papers; or the court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An award pursuant to this section shall
be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the award and the basis on which the
court arrived at the amount of the award.

(Proposed new language underlined; language to be deleted stricken)
PROPONENT
...

Beverly Hills Bar Association

STATEMENT OF REASONS
In Hersch v. Citizens Savings & Loan Assn., 146 Cal.App.3d 1002
(1983), the court imposed $125,000 in "damages pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure §907 , 11 even though the court said that the amount
of such damages could not be ascertained:

(_.

"Having determined that the appeal in this
case was taken for the purpose of delay, we must
address the subject (sic) appropriate remedy. The
statute itself provides that damages may be added
to the costs on appeal. Although the actual
damages sustained by plaintiffs in the form of
lost interest might be appropriately assessed,
there is nothing in the record here from which
calculation of such an amount can be made. No
inquiry was made into the subject • • • nor
were counsel placed on notice that any such
inquiry might be made. Absent any basis for
direct measurement of damages, we are left to
assess such an amount as will bear some
rational relationship to the circumstances
of the parties and to the purpose of Code of
Civil Procedure §907.
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"We find to be just, and add to plaintiff's
costs on appeal, damages in the sum of $125,000.
Attorney's fees on appeal are awarded to plaintiffs
in an amount to be determined by the trial court."
(146 Cal.App.3d at 1013).

(

We believe that a statute which authorizes a court to make an award
of $125,000 in sanctions without any ascertainable basis is just
too vulnerable to abuse.
Another problem with the statute as presently written is the statement in the Hersch opinion that such sanctions could be imposed
for an appeal taken for purposes of delay even though that appeal
was not frivolous. We do not believe that a party should be
penalized for taking action which has potential merit.
The amended statute trac~ California Code of Civil Procedure
§128.5 added in 1981, applicable to trial courts, which expresses
the Legislature's latest thoughts in this area.
This proposed amendment does not affect any other law, statute or
rule.
AUTHOR/PE~1ANENT

CONTACT

Peter Appleton (213) 553-6822

COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 2-29-84
San Diego County Bar Association
Recent case law at the appellate and supreme court level has set
forth the circumstances and procedure for sanctions at the
appellate level. The appeal process is unlike the process in
the trial court in that the case has already been litigated and
resulted in an award which is presumed correct. The appellate
court has the full record of trial court proceedings before it and
should have the authority to fashion sanctions which fit the facts
of an individual case. There is some question as to whether
existing Code of Civil Procedure §128.5 allows an award of
sanctions over and above actual expenses incurred by the
opposing litigant. The present proposal would inject that same
uncertainty at the appellate level.

COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 2-29-84
Santa Clara County Bar Association
This Resolution attenpts to limit the authority of appellate courts
to impose sanctions for "frivolous" appea.ls. While the goal is good,
the attempt is both deficient and results in a broadening of t.he
sanction power. The Resolution appears to permit sanctions where th~(
Court finds an appeal was taken for delay, even though the case was
not "frivolous."
The Resolution allows sanctions to be imposed on
·
the party who won in the trial court, for "oppo~ing an appeal without
good faith." ---
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The matter of sanctions in appellc..te matters
overall scheme established by statute or rule.
·"e disapproved.

should be set in an
Resolution should

Th~

DELEGATION
POmTION: _______________________________________________________
ASSIGNED

T~------------------------------------------------------------CALLED UP FOR!
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Debate

Full
Debate-----

-----

ACTION OF THE

CONFERENC~----------------------------------------------------

l

1984 CONFERENCE

2-29d-84
- 68 -

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION

No. 245

ASSEMBLY BILL

Introduced by Assembly Member Harris
January 12, 1987

An act to amend Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, relating to civil actions.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 245, as introduced, Harris. Civil actions: sanctions.
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the
party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses
incurred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not
based on good faith that are frivolous or solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay, as specified.
This bill would revise those provisions by making those
provisions applicable to tactics or actions not based on good
faith that are frivolous or that cause unnecessary delay, rather
than which are solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SECfiON 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is amended to read:
128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the
party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a
result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or
selely i:MeBEie6: te that cause unnecessary delay. This
section also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings
under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of
Title 3 of Part 3.
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(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to,
the making or opposing of motions or the filing and
service of a complaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing
of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing
party does not constitute "actions or tactics" for purposes
of this section.
(2) "Frivolous.. means (A) totally and completely
without merit or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an
opposing party.
(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be
imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving
or responding papers; or the court's own motion, after
notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the
conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
(d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition
to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions
within the purview of this section.

0
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.AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 11, 1987
(

CALIFORNIA LEGISLA'IUR.E-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION

No. 1252

ASSEMBLY BILL

Introduced by Assembly Member Zeltner
March 3, 1987

An act to reJf)ee:l 8:fttl aEle amend Section 128.5 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, relating to sanctions for frivolous
litigation.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1252, as amended, Zeltner. Sanctions for frivolous
actions.
Under existing law, a trial court may order a party, the
party's attorney, or both to pay expenses incurred by another
party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
This bill would, iftsteee in addition, provide that in an action
for personal injury or death a trial court may assess against
either party or its attorneys sanctions, inelttemg ettemey's
fees 8:fttl eeft9 in addition to expenses, up to a maximum of
$10,000, for making frivolous motions, ese:isB:ftg asserting
frivolous claims, or defenses, or causing unnecessary delays, as
specified.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
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The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1

SECfiON 1. It is the intent of the Legislature, in

2 enacting this act, to impose penalties against plaintiffs

3 and defendants for making frivolous motions or asserting
4 frivolous claims or defenses by awarding sanctions ;
5 Ht:ektamg eests eBEl att:emey's fees; in personal injury or
6 death actions, in addition to expenses, if a claim or
7 defense is made in bad faith or without any reasonable
8 basis in law or fact.
9
SEC. 2. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
10 is repealed.
11
~ 3: SeeaeB 198:5 is aeaea M the ~ ef Q¥il
12 Preee&t!re, M Pee&.
13
~ -fet 1ft e:,' flOBeft fer perseftal iftjttry er aeatft,
14 e: trW ee8ft ~ e:s H aeems jttfft; assess agfliftst eitfter
15 ~ er H9 attemeys sflfteaeBS, Ht:eltMiitlg att:emey's tees
16 flft8 eests; till M e: !ftHim1:UB ef tett Ht8ti8flfta ael:lars
17 ($19,9QQ) , ter male:ftg fftr;eleas meti8ft9, e:ssertiftg
18 frir;eleas eleims er aereMes, er efltt9iftg HB:fteeessary
19 eelays.
20
-tet A frir;elettS IB8B8ft, eleim er eefense, ter the
21 pl:ll'pese ef Hlis seeaeft, is eB:e !Batie ift
Wtft; either ter
22 Hie pl:ll'p8Se M prele:&ging er eeleyiftg Hie reselatieft et
23 Hie litigatieft eBEl M harass flftelher party, er ~ !Bflae
24 -.,.;itheat e:,' reaseBaele 8a:sis ift lew er ift ~ e&Eilael-Eiftg
25 e:,' ~ &itft &rgHJBeftt fer 8ft efieft8ieft, meameatieft,
26 er reversal ef eetiftg le¥r.
27
~ =Ate ee8ft IBflY assess the 8flfle8eM re!errea M ift
28 Hlis seetieft either e:t Hie time e fllles eft e: partiettlar
29 metieft; elaim, er aefeme, er M the time eE jaagmeftt, if
30 H ftft8s Hle:f Hie efttire ee:se er ae!eftse Htereef we:s
31 fftvelet:tS.

-.e

32 is amended to read:
33
128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the
34 party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses,

35 including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a
36 result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or
37 solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. This section
38 also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings under
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AB 1252

1 Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title
2 3 of Part 3.
3
(b) In any action for personal injury or death, a trial
4 court may, as it deems just, assess against either party or
5 its attorneys sanctions, up to a maximum of ten thousand

6 dollars ($10,(){X)), in addition to expenses specified in
7 subdivision (a) and apart from any actual monetary losses

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32

33
34
35
36
37

38

sustained, for making frivolous motions, asserting
frivolous claims or defenses, or causing unnecessary
delays.
For purposes of this section:
(1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to,
the making or opposing of motions or the filing and
service of a complaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing
of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing
party does not constitute "actions or tactics" for purposes
of this section.
(2) "Frivolous" means '(A) totally and completely
without merit or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an
opposing party.
(c)

(3) A frivolous motion, claim, or defense, for the
purpose ofsubdivision (b) is one made in bad faith, either
for the purpose of prolonging or delaying the resolution
of the litigation and to harass another party or made
without any reasonable basis in law or in fact and lacking
any good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
(d) The court may assess the sanctions referred to in
subdivision (b) either at the time it rules on a particular
motion, claim, or defense, or at the time ofjudgment, if
it finds that the entire case or defense thereof was
frivolous. However, sanctions may be assessed only upon
notice contained in a party~ moving papers or on the
court's own motion after notice and an opportunity to be
heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing
and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances
justifying the order.

-fet

39
(e) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be
40 imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving
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or responding papers; or the court's own motion, after
notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the
conduct or circumstances justifying the order.

-tar

(f) The liability imposed by this section is in addition
to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions
within the purview of this section.

0
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ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 1252

Introduced by Assembly Member Zeltner
March 3, 1987

An act to repeal and add Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, relating to sanctions for frivolous litigation.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1252, as introduced, Zeltner. Sanctions for frivolous
actions.
Under existing law, a trial court may order a party, the
party's attorney, or both to pay expenses incurred by another
party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
This bill would, instead, provide that in an action for
personal injury or death a trial court may assess against either
party or its attorneys sanctions, including attorney's fees and
costs, up to a maximum of $10,000, for making frivolous
motions, assisting frivolous claims, or defenses, or causing
unnecessary delays, as specified.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

SECTION 1. It is the intent of the Legislature, in
enacting this act, to impose penalties against plaintiffs
and defendants for making frivolous motions or asserting
frivolous claims or defenses by awarding sanctions,
including costs and attorney's fees, if a claim or defense
is made in bad faith or without any reasonable basis in law
or fact.
SEC. 2. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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is repealed.
~

W

'Eve¥)' ffiftl eettff ffi'ftY ~

party, Mle
party's attoFney, et' ~ -te pay 8:ftY reasonaQle expenses,
including attonwy's fees; incurred ey another~ as a
rest:Ilt of eae/fa#ft actions et' tactics ~ ftfe fpivolous et'
solely i:ntesded -te eau.9C usnecessaYy delay. =Ffti:s section
£tlse applies -te judicial arhitYation proceedings tiHder
Chapter M (eommeHeiag wHh SectioH HU.lO) of +#le
g ef Paft &.fBt ~purposes of~ sectioft:
fB- "Actioss et' tactics" iHdude, ~ ftfe ~limited -te;
Mte makiHg et' opposisg of motions et' Mte ftl.ing and
seFvice of a complaiHt et' eresslcomplaist. =Ate me¥e flltng
of a complaint without service thereof en an opposisg
~ 6-ees fief constitute "aetioss et' tactics" for puFposes
of~ section.
~ "Frivolous" means W
totallry· and completely
without ffiCf'# et' -fBi- for Mte sele purpose of haFassing an
opposing party.
Expenses pursuant -te ~ seetioR shttil ~ eo
imposed except en notice coHtaise€1 ffi a party's moving
et' resposdiag papers, et' Mte court's ewn motion, ~
notiee and opportunit)' -te eo heard. An ~ imposing
expenses S:ft.alt eo ffi Wf'itisg and shttif recite ffi detail Mle
coftduct et' circumstances justifying Mte oYdeF.
~ =Ate l-iabil-ity imposed ey ~ secaon is ffi addition
-te tffiY ~ liability imposed ey law for ~ et' omissions
witftis Mte purview of ~ section.
SEC. 3. Section 128.5 is added to the Code of Civil
Procedure, to read:
128.5. (a) In any action for personal injury or death,
a trial court may, as it deems just, assess against either
party or its attorneys sanctions, including attorney's fees
and costs, up to a maximum of ten thousand dollars
($10,000), for making frivolous motions, asserting
frivolous claims or defenses, or causing unnecessary
delays.
.
(h) A frivolous motion, claim or defense, for the
purpose of this section, is one made in bad faith, either for
the purpose of prolonging or delaying the resolution of

w
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the litigation and to harass another party, or (2) made
without any reasonable basis in law or in fact and lacking
any good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
(c) The court may assess the sanctions referred to in
this section either at the time it rules on a particular
motion, claim, or defense, or at the time of judgment, if
it finds that the entire case or defense thereof was
frivolous.

0
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CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION
Fox Plaza, Suite 208 • 1390 Market Street • San Francisco, California 94102

(415) 552-7660

April 20, 1987
EXECUTIVE BOARD
1986-1987
Hon. Elwood Lui
President
Hon. Richard H. Breiner
Vice President

Hon. Philip M. Saeta
Vice President

Hon. George M. Dell (Ret.)
Secretary-Treasurer
Hon. J. Michael Byrne
Hon. Candace D. Cooper
Hon. H. Ronald Domnitz
Hon. Norman R. Dowds
Hon. Coleman E Fannin
Hon. Irwin H. Garfinkel
Hon. Arnold D. Gowans
Hon. Nancy Hoffman
Hon. Anthony C. Joseph
Hon. V. Gene McDonald
Hon. Fred R. Metheny, Jr.
Hon. Philip J. Moscone
Hon. James E Nelson
Hon. Joseph A. Orr
Hon. Frank S. Pierson
Hon. Leon Savitch
Hon. Howard L. Schwartz
Hon. John V. Stroud
Hon. Marvin G. Weeks
Hon. Stanley C. Young, Jr.
Constance E. Dove
Executive Director

Hon. Elihu Harris, Chairman
Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol, Room 6005
Sacramento, CA 95814
RE: AB 1252 (Zeltner)
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
I am writing on behalf of the California Judges Association to
express our opposition to AB 1252, which authorizes sanctions
for frivolous motions, but only in wrongful death and personal
injury cases. It is unfortunate that this bill repeals CCP
§128.5 which the judges find to be a sound and useful provision
for control of delaying tactics.
If we can be of assistance with the problems addressed by this
bill, please feel free to consult with our Civil Law and
Procedure Committee Chairman, Judge Roger K. ~Jarren, Sacramento
Superior Court, (916) 440-7848.
Thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns.
Sincerely,

Constance E. Dove
Executive Director
c:

Hon. Roger K. Warren
Hon. Elwood Lui
Loren V. Smith (0-II)
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LOS ANGELES COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES' ASSOCIATION
legislation Committee
BRIAN D. CRAHAN
Chairman

110 North Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90012

(213) 974-6209

April 6, 1987

Honorable Elihu Harris, Chair
Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Re:

AB 1252 (Zeltner)

Dear Assembly Member Harris:
The Los Angeles County Municipal Court Judges' Association
opposes AB 1252, which would authorize the imposition of up to
$10,000 in attorneys' fees and costs upon a party or attorney
making a frivolous motion or causing an unnecessary delay in an
action for personal injury or wrongful death.
We object to the deletion of the present provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure §128.5 which we believe to be a useful and
adequate safeguard against frivolous tactics, and we further
oppose the limitation of sanctions to certain categories of
&ctions in this bill.
Sin~erely,

\

BRI~.

CRAIIAN
Judge, Municipal Court

BDC:AMS/jw
cc:

Honorable Paul Zeltner
Ruben Lopez
Committee Consultant
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THE STATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA

I

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
lNntor, MARK T HARRIS

!lOO ELE\·E:-;TH STREET, SL'ITE 315, SACRAME'\1D, CALIFORNIA 9)814

(910) 444-2762

June 25, 1987

The Honorable Paul E. Zeltner
Assembly Member. 54th District
State Capitol, Room 5130
Sacramento. CA 95814

fir= 0AB 1252

Position:

Oppose Unless Amended

Dear As&'~mber Zeltner:
The State Bar Family Law Section, composed of experts in the
field of family law, has reviewed your measure and taken the
position noted above.
Their comments are detailed in the
enclosed report.
THIS POSITION IS BEING PRESENTED ONLY ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILY LAW
SECTION OF THE STATE BAR AND BAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OR THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. AND
SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPRESENTING THE POSITION OF THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
MEMBERSHIP IN THE FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE
THE SECTION IS COMPOSED OF 2. 300 MEMBERS
STATE BAR IS VOLUNTARY.
FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.

It is the policy of the State Bar to refer legislative proposals
affecting specific legal questions or the practice of law to the
appropriate State Bar Committee or Section for review and comment.
Our legislative activity is aimed at bringing the expertise of California's lawyers to the assistance of the people of
the state through the legislative process.
Legislative efforts
are focused upon the advancement and improvement of law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice.
Please do not hesitate to contact me for further information on
this position. We would welcome the opportunity to meet with you
or your staff on this issue.

JAH: j

Enclosure
cc: Deborah DeBow, Consultant
Assembly Judiciary Committee
....

- 80 -

FAMILY LAW SECTION
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Clau
IRA H Ll'R\'EY, LAs A•f<l<>

E..c~ttiu

Vut·Ciu.n
MARGARET L. ANDERSON, !'.14/u.,.
Smoru,ry I fftt1Jl.(ff'l

STEPHEN A KALEMKARIAN, Frnno

s..,.

Adi.!UCT

PAMELA E PIERSON. S.n

F'"""'"

R,,,.,,d,

St.u &r SUJff AiM1111Uhaicr

DONALD W. BREER

555 FRANKLIN STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-4498
{415) 561-8200

TO:

Judith Harper, Office of the Legislative Representative

FROM:

Lynne Yates-Carter, Legislative Coordinator

DATE:

June 15, 1987

RE:

AB 1252 (Zeltner) as introduced 3/3/87.

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION:

COMtruJlu

MARGARET L ANDERSON. P.l41u""'
ROBERT J fRIEDMAN. Los A•l''"
DANIEL B HUNTER. s,, D>tgo
STEPHEN A KALEMKARIAN, Fm"'
IRA H LUR\'EY, Los A•g<ln
LAWRENCE A MOSKOWITZ.
Rruc
MARTIN C. PACHTER. J..., A-.gd"
JOHN REPLOGLE.
RICHARD SHERMAS. imt<<t>
CHARLES H. SOLEY, F>tm
LOWELL H SUCHERMAN. San Fm•wco
ANDREW G WAGNER. S.n lhtgc
LINDA N WISOTSKY. Bnnl, Hd,.
LYNNE YATES-CARTER. Sanjou

Oppose unless amended.

JUN 1 S 1987

Priority II.

ANALYSIS :
This bill would amend California Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5,
which deals with the court's ability to impose attorneys fees and costs for
non-meritorious actions in several important respects.
The bill would:
1) Provide that CCP 128.5 sanctions only apply to personal injury
and wrongful death actions;
2) Set a cap on the award of $10,000;
3) Redefine what constitutes frivolous or bad faith actions;
4) Specifically provide that the court could assess sanctions at
the time it rules on a partciular motion, claim or defense or at the end of the
entire proceedings.
The Family Law Section Executive Committee opposes this bill unless it is
amended to remove the limitation to personal injury and wrongful death actions and
the $10,000 cap on the award. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has been used
in family law cases as an additional remedy for parties in family law litigation
who have been faced with bad faith, non-meritorious actions. The appellate court
has upheld an award in a family law case in excess of $10,000. The committee felt
that the arbitrary $10,000 cap was inappropriate. However, the committee did
approve of the re-drafting of the provisions on what would constitute a basis for
a motion under this section. Since AB 245 (Harris) also would modify this
section, the committee felt it would be helpful if the changes contemplated by
both bills were incorporated in one measure.
PURVIEW :
The Family Law Section has been charged with promoting the efficient
administration of justice. This bill, which would eliminate one tool presently
available to family law practitioners in limiting frivolous actions and tactics in
family law proceedings, would directly impact on the efficient administration of
family law matters and thus falls within the committee's purview.
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JUDITH HARPER
AE 1252

PUBLIC POLICY :
The public policy of this state supports the efficient administration of
the courts and promoting the use, but not abuse, of the courtroom.
In limiting
the use of Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 to personal injury and wrongful
death actions and setting a ceiling on the allowable fees and costs, this bill
would limit the availability of a potent weapon against frivolous proceedings and
claims. The Family Law Section Executive Committee believes that in its present
form, this bill is against the best interests of the public and would therefore
oppose the bill unless it is amended.

~y;_zr~/-LYNN( YATES-CARTER
Legislative Coordinator
cc:

Ira Lurvey
David Long
Dennis Cornell
Don Breer
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ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 1914

Introduced by Assembly Member Harris
March 5, 1987

An act to add Section 447 to the Code of Civil Procedure,
relating to civil actions.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1914, as introduced, Harris. Civil law: frivolous actions.
Existing law requires every pleading to be subscribed by
the party or the party's attorney. Existing law authorizes a
trial court to impose sanctions for bad faith actions or tactics.
This bill would provide that the signature of an attorney or
party is a certificate that he or she has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper, that it is well grounded in fact and
warranted by law, as specified, and not made for an improper
purpose. The bill would require an unsigned pleading,
motion, or other paper to be signed, and to be stricken if not
signed promptly. The bill would authorize the imposition of
sanctions if a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of the requirements of the bill.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

SECTION 1. Section 447 is added to the Code of Civil
Procedure, to read:
447. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes
a certificate by him or her that he or she has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his
or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is
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warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or cause unnecessay delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this section, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.

0
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 2, 1987
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 17, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 28,1987
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 14,1987
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 23, 1987
AMENDED IN SENATE MARCH 16, 1987

SENATE BILL

No. 379

Introduced by Senator Presley

February 12, 1987

An act to add and repeal Sections 447 and 1021.1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, relating to civil actions.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 379, as amended, Presley. Civil actions.
(1) Existing law authorizes the court to order a party, the
party's attorney, or both, to pay reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as the
result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay.
This bill would provide that the signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the person has read the
pleading, motion, or paper, and that it is well grounded and
not interposed for an improper purpose. It would provide that
if the paper is not signed it shall be stricken if not promptly
signed. If a pleading is signed in violation of the above
provisions, the court would, upon motion or its own initiative
and after an opportunity to be heard, impose sanctions.
(2) Under existing law, in the absence of some special
circumstance, such as a contractual agreement or specific
statutory provision to the contrary, each party to a legal
- 85 -
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dispute is to bear the
fees.
There are numerous
on specific
substantive issues which
to award
attorney's fees to one party
the expense of another party.
This bill would provide that a party makes a specified
settlement offer that is
accepted and the party not
accepting the offer fails to obtain a more favorable offer, the
party making the offer could, in the courf s discretion, be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees for services after the date
of the offer, as specified.
(3) The bill would apply only in Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties; ftftEl ·.vould authori~e ~ hoMes et
superYisors et ffto.se counties .ffi require ~ presiding juage et
#te superior eeufi te Fepor"t te #te Legislature, as specifieS. It
would require the Judicial Council to assess the impact of the
bill upon court congestion, as
and to report to the
Legislature on or before
1, 199L
(4) The provisions
other than those relating to
the Judicial Council would
until January 1,
.J:.99a 1991, when # they would
committee: ft&
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no.
yes. State-mandated local program: no.

enact as follows:

The people of the State

1
SECTION 1.
447 is
Code of Civil
2 Procedure, to read:
an
3
447. (a) The signature
4 constitutes a ..-.~·~h~-'""
5 read the pleading,
6 of his or her
7 after reasonable
8 warranted by
9 the extension,
10 and that it is not
11 such as to harass or cause unne1ces;sa:r
12 increase in the cost of
13 other paper is not
14 signed promptly
is called to the
15 attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion,
LU\JUJ:..U"-'""U'-''- ...
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or other paper is signed
violation of this section, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Sanctions may be
imposed only after notice and opportunity to be heard.
An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing, and shall
recite in detail the circumstances justifying sanctions.
(b) This section shall apply only in Riverside County
and San Bernardino County. The Legislature finds and
declares that, in order to assess the impact of this section
on a limited basis before making it applicable on a
statewide basis, it is necessary for this section to be
applicable for a limited period of time in those counties.
(c) This section shall remain in effect until January 1,
±9W 1991, and on that date is repealed, unless a later
enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before
January 1, ±9W 1991, deletes or extends that date.
SEC. 2. Section 1021.1 is added to the Code of Civil
Procedure, to read:
1021.1. (a) Reasonable attorney's fees, may be
awarded in an amount to be determined in the court's
discretion, to a party to any civil action as provided by this
section, and that award shall be made upon notice and
motion by a party and shall be an element of the costs of
suit.
(b) A party may be entitled, in the discretion of the
court, to an award of attorney's fees under this section if
all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The party has made an offer for judgment under
Section 998.
(2) That offer was not accepted within the time
provided in Section 998.
(3) The party to whom the offer was made thereafter
failed to obtain a more favorable judgment.
The party making the offer shall be entitled to
attorney's fees only for legal services rendered after the
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1 date of the
2
(c) In
to award attorney's fees
the following factors:
3 the court shall
4
(1) The reasonableness or lack thereof, of a party's
5 failure to accept an
for judgment under Section 998
6 in light of the facts known to the party at the time, of
7 which, in light of
of the circumstances, should have
8 been known to the party. Reasonableness shall be
9 determined by a consideration of at least the following
10 matters:
11
(A) The then
merit or lack of merit in the
12 claim that was
subject of the action.
13
(B) The closeness of the questions of fact and law at
14 issue.
15
offeror has unreasonably refused to
(C) Whether
16 furnish information necessary to evaluate the
17 reasonableness
the offer.
(D) Whether the action was in the nature of a "test
18
19 case," presenting questions
far-reaching importance
20 affecting nonparties.
21
(E) The relief
might reasonably have been
22 expected if the
should prevail.
23
(F) The amount
the additional delay, cost, and
24 expense that the
reasonably would be expected to
25 incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
26
(G) Those other matters that the court may deem
27 relevant in the
of justice.
(2) The
damages and other relief sought
28
29 and the results
the client.
30
(3) The
by the parties or the attorneys to
31 settle the controversy.
(4) The .::::.vic•+-"""
32
33 procedure by
(d) In exerciS:ing
34
35 amount of at"t-nrrt""'\7
except that in no event
36 consider the follo\\ing
37 shall the amount awarded exceed a reasonable fee for the
38 services actually
39
community in which the
(1) Customary
pending charged by attorneys
40 action or proceeding
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1 with similar experience or expertise.
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(2) The time and labor reasonably required to be
spent by the attorney or attorneys.
(3) The experience and ability of the attorneys
generally within the profession and also with respect to
the action or proceeding.
(4) The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill required to perform the services
properly.
(5) The extent to which the acceptance of the
particular matter imposes extraordinary burdens on the
attorney or attorneys (A) by way of precluding other
employment, (B) by the time limitations imposed by the
client, or (C) by the circumstances.
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(7) Those other factors that the court may deem
relevant in the interest of justice, including any of the
factors described in subdivision (c).
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal
or modify any other statutory provision for the award of
attorney's fees or to diminish any express or implied
contractual right which a party to a civil action may
otherwise have to obtain an award of attorney's fees for
the prosecution or defense of an action.
(f) No attorney's fees shall be awarded pursuant to this
section in any of the following instances:
(1) Against a party who is proceeding in forma
pauperis or a party whom the court has found not to have
the financial ability to pay fees or who would suffer an
unreasonable financial hardship if ordered to pay fees.
(2) For or against any party with respect to any cause
of action under which an award for reasonable attorney's
fees is authorized or required by any other federal or
California statute.
(3) For or against any party with respect to any cause
of action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted under
the provisions of Title 7 (commencing with Section
1230.010) of Part 3.
(4) For or against any party in any action in which one
or more of plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class under
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Section 382.
(5) For or against
as to any cause of action
the gravamen of
is personal injury M wroBgful
death, wrongful death, or injunctive relief.
(g) The determination under this section shall be
made after the final disposition of the action.
(h) This section shall apply only in Riverside County
and San Bernardino County. The Legislature finds and
declares that, in order to assess the impact of this section
on a limited basis before making it applicable on a
statewide basis, it is necessary for this section to be
applicable for a limited period of time in those counties.
-fit +he Board of 8uperYisors of Riverside CotHl:ty M
8afl BeFnardiflo CouBty, respectively, m.-ay require ~
presidiBg judge of ~ superior eetH"t ffi periodieatly
report ffi .tfte JudieiaFy Com:IBittees of ~ Assem:bly ftftEl
ffi ~ 8eBate ftftEl ffi .tfte Speaker of.~ Assem:bly ftftEl f6
.tfte Prestdent pre Tem:pere of .tfte 8e:aate ttS ffi ~
impact, # a:ay; of tffis section eft ftftY M aH of .tfte folle·Niftg.
+±+ bft5e filings.
-fQt Reductien of ~ ~ ame of ~ te
settlem:ent M triab
f3t Yse of effers fo'f' judgmeflt uBdeF 8ectien 99&
-f4t +he numbeF of dispesitiens ey settleffteftt.

-tft
This section shall remain in effect until January 1,
~ 1991, and on that date is repealed, unless a later
enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before
January l, ~ 1991,
or extends that date.
SEC. 3. (a) It is the purpose of this act to reduce
court congestion. It is the further purpose of adding
Section 447 to the
Civil Procedure to determine
whether that section will result in pleadings that are
accurate, based upon a reasonable investigation, and are
not frivolous. For courts in Riverside County and San
Bernardino County the effectiveness of this act shall be
determined by whether, and to what extent, this act
accomplishes the following goals:
(1) Reduces caseload by 20 percent.
(2) Reduces frivolous actions by 20 percent.
(i)
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(3) Increases the early settlement of cases by 20
percent.
(b) The Judicial Council shall assess the impact of this
act upon the courts to which it applies, and shall report
its findings to the Legislature on or before January 1, 1991.
The assessment and report shall include a determination
of the number of filings in affected courts, the number of
issues involving verification ofpleadings that were raised,
whether those issues required a court hearing, the
number of cases in which sanctions were requested
under Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
whether the judges believe that Section 447 of the Code
of Civil Procedure contributes to a reduction of
unfounded civil litigation. The report shall particularly
address whether this act has accomplished the goals set
forth in subdivision (a).
(c) The presiding judges of the courts in which this act
applies shall cooperate with the Judicial Council in the
assessment and report required by this section.

0
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ELIHU M. HARRIS. Chairman
SB 379 (Presley) -As Amended:

August 17, 1987

PRIOR ACTION
Sen. Com. on JUD. 6-4

Sen. Floor 23-3

SUBJECT: This bill establishes a pilot project in two counties which will
requ1re (1) certification of pleadings and other papers as well grounded and
(2) provide for attorneys' fee shifting under specified circumstances.
DIGEST
This bill provides for a limited duration pilot project in Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties. Specifically it provides that, in those counties, until
January 1, 1993:
1)

2)

The signature of an attorney or party on a pleading, motion or other paper
certifies that:
a)

The person has read the paper.

b)

He or she knows or believes it is well grounded in fact and warranted
either by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal thereof and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose such as delay, harassment or needlessly increasing
litigation costs. If the paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless promptly signed after the omission is called to the pleader or
movant's attention. If the paper is signed in violation of the
requirements of the bill, the court shall impose an appropriate
sanction upon the party and/or the signer. The sanction may include
an order to pay expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other
parties because of the filing of the paper.

Reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded to a party in a civil action if
he or she has made an offer of compromise under Civil Procedure Code
Section 998 which was not timely accepted and the rejecting party fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment. Fees may be awarded only for legal
services rendered after the date of the offer. In relation to this
provision, the bill further provides that:
a)

In deciding whether to award fees, the court shall consider:

- continued SB 379
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i) The reasonableness of the failure to accept the Section 998 offer.
ii)
iii)

The amount of damages sought and the results contained.
The efforts made by the parties or the attorneys to settle the
controversy.

iv) The existence of any bad faith or abuse of legal procedure by the
parties or the attorneys.
b) The amount of the award shall be in the court's discretion, subject to
considerations of the following factors:
i)

Customary fees charged by similarly experienced attorneys in the
community.

ii) The time and labor reasonably required as well as the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required.
iii)

The experience and ability of the attorneys as well as the extent
to which acceptance of the particular matter imposes extraordinary
burdens on the attorneys.

iv) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
c) A fee award is excluded:
i)

ii)
iii)

iv)
v)
d)

Against an indigent party or a party who does not have the ability
to pay.
For or against a party if an award is authorized by any other
statute.
In eminent domain actions.
In class actions.
In personal injury or wrongful death actions.

It shall not be construed to repeal or modify any other statutory
attorneys' fee award provision or to diminish any contractual right
which a party may otherwise have to obtain an award of attorney's
fees.

- continued SB 379
Page 2
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e)

The respective County Boards of Supervisors may require the presiding
judges to report to the Legislature as to the impact on case filings,
delay reduction, Section 998 offers, and settlements.

FISCAL EFFECT
None
COMMENTS
1)

The California Council of Land Surveyors and Engineers (Council) is the
source of this bill's requirement that an attorney or party must certify
that a pleading, motion or paper is well grounded and not interposed for a
improper purpose. According to the Council, that provision is
substantially similar to Federal Rule 11, except it has been modified to
conform to existing California requirements for verification of pleadings.
The Council further states that the purpose and intent of the rule is "to
insure that allegations are supported by sufficient factual information
such that the claims asserted are not frivolous."

2)

The California Supreme Court held in In re Marriage of Flaherth (1982) 31
Cal.3d 637 that "Fundamental constitutional mandates require tat the
basic protections of due process be followed before an attorney is fined
for prosecuting a frivolous appeal." The court further stated that
"Penalties for prosecuting frivolous appeals should not be imposed without
giving fair warning, affording the attorney an opportunity to respond to
the charge, and holding a hearing. Further, when imposing sanctions, the
court should provide the attorney with a written statement of the reasons
for the penalty."
Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 which authorizes the imposition of
sanctions for frivolous or delaying bad-faith actions or tactics provides
that "Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on
notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's
own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or
circumstances justifying the order."
In order to conform to the requirements of Flahertt, should not this bill
be amended to provide due process protections simi ar to those contained
in Section 128.5?

3)

The California Legal Reform Project (CLRP) is the source of this bill's
fee shifting provisions. CLRP states that those provisions have been
- continued SB 379
~age 3
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l'age 4
carefully crafted to "confine judicial discretion through criteria of
the fees and (to) prohibit an award of
reasonableness of the offer and
fees against a person as to whom such an award would represent a financial
hardship." CLRP further states its belief that the bill "will produce
meaningful data to guide us in future actions to improve the civil justice
system ...
In support of this measure, the Attorney General's office states that
"Because frivolous or weak claims are becoming a substantial problem in
our courts, we believe that SB 379 is a reasonable approach to at least
assuring that settlement offers made under Code of Civil Procedure section
998 are seriously made and seriously considered by the parties in civil
actions. Hopefully, this bill will help mitigate the court congestion
that most California counties are now experiencing."
4)

The Alliance of American Insurers and the California State Automobile
Association (CSAA) oppose this bill. CSAA states that the bill would
allow plaintiffs an unfair "leverage" in many cases because a defendant
often does not know litigation is pending "until he is served and thus,
may need to conduct extensive and often lengthy investigation and
discovery before he can respond to, or make an offer. 11 CSAA therefore
states its concern that this bill would enable a plaintiff to force the
defendant to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees simply by making an offer to
settle before the defendant has had a chance to evaluate the case. CSAA
also argues that the bill places insurance carriers "in a virtual no-win
situation because a losing plaintiff is often judgment proof or has no
assets with which to pay defendant's attorney's fees."

5)

The Access to Justice Foundation (AJF) opposes this bill. Along with
Common Cause (CC), AJF has suggested that the bill be amended to provide
that its fee shifting provisions apply only to cases "that seek money
damages at law only." CC points out that various provisions of law allow
for injunctive relief and other equitable remedies and that in some cases
the plaintiff may be "acting as a kind of class representative. He/she
may file an action and may be seeking restitution (or) collaterally minor
money damages in order to right a larger wrong."
CC further states that it is in society's interest, once such an action is
brought, to allow the litigants to pursue it, particularly where others
forego action awaiting injunctive result. CC argues that if a small
restitution amount may also be involved, it 1s possible for an egregious
defendant to 11 buy out the case" by offering that restitutionary amount of
money to the plaintiff. It is argued that vulnerability to a large fee
award may effectively "require" a plaintiff to accept the offer and end
the case, thereby "forfeiting the injunctive benefits for .•• society as a
whole."
- continued SB 379
l'age 4
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6)

The American Civil Liberties Union opposes this bill. The ACLU argues
that the fee-shifting provisions "may force a party to accept a settlement
offer rather than exercise his or her rights to seek a full trial and
award of damages based on the merits of the case." The ACLU further
questions "the propriety of limiting the right to access courts for the
residents of (the two specified counties). We also question whether a
study of the effectiveness of this proposal would be of any significance
if the areas to which it applies are not representative of the varieties
of civil court jurisdictions throughout the state."

7)

This bill is a two-county, five-year pilot project which authorizes the
Boards of Supervisors of the affected counties to require the presiding
judges to report to the Legislature regarding the impact of the
fee-shifting provisions. Is not the Judicial Council the most appropriate
entity to survey and report on any such impact? Should not the bill
provide for a report on both of the projects which it establishes (i.e.,
the sanctions for improper-certification as well as the fee shifting
provisions)?

SUPPORT

OPPOSITION

California Judges Association
Attorney General, State of
California
County Supervisors Association of
California
Association of California Water
Agencies
Los Angles County Superior Court

American Civil Liberties Union
Access to Justice Foundation
California State Automobile Association
Alliance of American Insurers

R. LeBov

SB 379
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RESOLUTION 4-11-87

(

DIGEST
Signatures on Pleadings: Certification of Compliance
Amends Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 to state that the signature on a pleading
certifies that the pleading satisfies the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.
RESOLUTIONS COMMITTEE REPORT
Recommend DISAPPROVE
History:
Similar to 1986 Resolution 4-10, which was disapproved. Identical to AB 1984
(Harris) and SB 379 (Presley), except that these bills would add section 447 to the
Code of Civil Procedure instead of amending Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.
Reasons:
This resolution makes the signature on a pleading a certification that the signing
party has read the pleading, that it is not interposed as a bad faith action, that it is
not frivolous, and that it is not intended to cause unnecessary delay. The resolution
adopts a requirement for California consistent with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 11, ignoring the fact that section 128.5, subdivision (a) already
accomplishes this end. The resolution is, therefore, redundant. Additionally, insofar
as this resolution is directed at attorneys, its purpose is served by Rule 6-lOl(A) of
the rules of Professional Conduct and is thus unnecessary.

• • • • • • • • • • • * * * • • • * * • * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • * • •
SECTION/COMMITTEE REPORTS
COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Recommend DISAPPROVE
Reasons:
The Committee on the Administration of Justice does not condone bad faith or frivilous
pleadings. However, this proposal will not add to already existing California law designed to
discourage such pleading practices. If such a change were enacted, it should be placed in Code
of Civil Procedure section 446, which obligates a party to sign pleadings, not in section 128.5
which does not directly deal with pleadings.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION
RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates recommends that legislation be sponsored to amend California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 128.5 to read as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Section 128.5
(a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney,
or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith
actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial
arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with
Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3. ,l(b) The signature of
an attorney 2£ party on ~ complaint, motion ££ any other
pleading constitutes a certificate that he 2£ she has read the
pleading and that, to the best of his or her knowledge,
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is
not interposed ~ ~ bad faith action 2£ tactic and that it is
not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
fb+ ..W.. For purposes of this section: ,, (1) "Actions or
tactics" include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing
of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or crosscomplaint. The mere filing of a complaint without service
thereof on an opposing party does not constitute "actions or
tactics" for purposes of this section. ,1(2) "Frivolous" means
(A) totally and completely without merit or (B) for the sole
purpose of harassing an opposing party. tfe+ (d) Expenses
pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice
contained in a party's moving or responding papers: or the
court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard.
An order imposing expenses shall be in writing and shall recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
fd+ ~ The liability imposed by this section is in addition
to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions
within the purview of this section.

)

(Proposed new language underlined; language to be deleted stricken)
PROPONENT:

The Bar Association of San Francisco

STATEMENT OF REASONS:
Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by the
Legislature during its 1985-86 Regular Session (Ch. 297, 5B 296)
to provide that "bad faith actions" and tactics which are "solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay" can be the basis for sanctions
at the discretion of the Court. This resolution would add a new
subsection (b) to Section 128.5 to clarify that the signature
of an attorney or party on a complaint, motion or other pleading
is a certification that a reasonable inquiry into the facts and
law on which the pleading is based has been made, and that it
is neither frivolous nor interposed for any of the improper purposes outlined in Section 128.5. While the resolution would
emphasize to attorneys and parties that the signing of a complaint,
motion or other pleading is a serious and meaningful act requiring
some forethought, it does not expand the scope of conduct which
is sanctionable under Section 128.5.

)

This proposed change in Section 128.5 would not affect any other
statute, law, or court rule.
AUTHOR AND/OR PERMANENT CONTACT:
and Betsy Jolley (415) 392-6320.

James W. Morando (415) 954-4457

RESPONSIBLE FLOOR DELEGATES: James W. Morando (415) 954-4457
and Betsy Jolley (415) 392-6320.

)
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COUNTER-ARGUMENT
TO RESOLUTION 4-11-87
,.
(

Alameda County Bar Association
The Alameda County Bar Association urges disapproval of Resolution
4-11-87 because it feels that the present law adequately takes
care of situations involving bad faith actions or tactics and
therefore feels the resolution is unnecessary.
This resolution seeks to have language inserted in Code of Civil
Procedures Section 128.5
that, in substance, an attorney or
party who signs a complaint, motion or other pleading verifies
that in fact he or she has read the pleading, and that "after
reasonable inquiry" the pleading is not "interposed as a bad
faith action or tactic," nor is it "frivolous" or "solely intended
to cause unnecessary delay." The proposal does not seek to expand
the current law, but is intended to emphasize to attorneys and
parties that signature "is a serious and meaningful act requiring
some forethought .
., Although not indicated in the Statement
of Reasons, this proposal is patterned after Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.
It is not believed that this proposal would accomplish anything
of any significance, and in fact, would be a detriment.
If the
proposed language is passed, the focus of inquiry on any hearing
would, in part, become the nature of the investigation done in
order to meet the requirement of "after reasonable inquiry."
Particularly in actions where one side has a great economic power
over the other side, it is likely to cause greater litigation,
with the focal point of the litigation being what an attorney
has done to investigate the facts underlying the pleading.
The
current law provides sufficient guidance for trial courts regarding
this issue, and no further delineation of the statute is necessary.
COUNTERARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 4-ll-87
ANTELOPE VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION

This resolution would reauire an attorney to attest to the merit of any complaint, motion,
etc., that he or she signs. This is clearly unnecessary because Code of Civil Procedure
Section 128.5 already covers the area sufficiently.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 4-11-87
San Diego County Bar Association
The language is surplusage. Parties generally only sign
verifications or declarations which are under penalty of
perjury. Attorneys are officers of the Court and are bound by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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